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The law of exclusionary vertical restraints-contractual or other
business relationships between vertically related firms-is deeply confused
and inconsistent in both the United States and the European Union. A
variety of vertical practices, including predatory pricing, tying, exclusive
dealing, price discrimination, and bundling, are treated very differently
based on formalistic distinctions that bear no relationship to the practices'
exclusionary potential. We propose a comprehensive, unified test for all
exclusionary vertical restraints that centers on two factors: foreclosure and
substantiality. We then assign economic content to these factors. A
restraint forecloses if it denies equally efficient rivals a reasonable
opportunity to make a sale or purchase (depending on whether the restraint
affects access to customers or inputs). Market foreclosure is substantial if it
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denies rivals a reasonable opportunity to reach minimum viable scale.
When substantial foreclosure is shown, the restraint should generally be
declared illegal unless it is justified by efficiencies that exceed the
restraint's anticompetitive effects.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The law of exclusionary vertical restraints-contractual arrangements
or informal business relationships between vertically related firms that
impair the competitiveness of either the upstream or downstream market-
is largely incoherent in both the United States and the European Union.'
The sources of this incoherence are potentially twofold.
1. In discussing the law of the European Union, we focus on the law developed under Articles
101 and 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union ("TFEU"), as interpreted by the
European Commission, the European Court of First Instance, and the European Court of Justice, not on
the national laws of any member states of the European Union. See Consolidated Version of the Treaty
on the Functioning of the European Union arts. 101-102, May 9, 2008, 2008 O.J. (C 115) 47, 88-89




First, in both jurisdictions, antitrust law is primarily made by
generalist courts giving effect to discrete statutory or treaty texts.2 Hence,
some of the incoherence in the case law may be the product of unavoidable
statutory constructions that require courts to treat economically similar
commercial practices differently despite the economic fungibility of the
practices. It is doubtful, however, that statutory or treaty design accounts
for much of the incoherence. The foundational legal instruments of both
jurisdictions are sufficiently open textured to accommodate judicial
development of a unified and coherent account of vertical restraints.
Rather than reflecting an avoidable rendering of statutory or treaty
commands, the incoherence largely arises from a failure to grasp the
commonalities among the various forms of vertical restraints. In particular,
much of the confusion arises from the courts' failure systematically to
consider three sets of related factors: (1) whether the restraint involves a
nominal price reduction (as in the case of predatory pricing, price
discrimination, and bundled discounting) or nonprice coercion (as in the
case of exclusive dealing and tying); (2) whether the restraint involves a
single product (as in a single-product exclusive dealing contract) or
multiple products (as in the case of tying arrangements or bundled
discounts); and (3) whether the restraint harms competition at the level of
the firm giving the discount (as in the case of "primary line" price
discrimination) or at the level of the firm receiving the discount (as in the
case of "secondary line" price discrimination).
In this Article, we argue that all allegedly exclusionary vertical
restraints should be analyzed under a single organizing principle:
substantial foreclosure. In every exclusionary vertical restraints case, the
ultimate question should be whether the loyalty-inducing provision poses
an unacceptable risk of harming consumer welfare by denying to rivals a
reasonable opportunity to participate efficiently in the market and whether
it does so without a sufficient efficiency justification. In order to make this
assessment, three analytical questions must be answered.
First, does the vertical restraint "foreclose" any portion of the relevant
market? The answer depends on whether rivals have a reasonable
2. See generally DANIEL A. CRANE, THE INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE OF ANTITRUST
ENFORCEMENT (2011) (introducing antitrust institutions from various jurisdictions including the United
States and the European Union).
3. See Andrew I. Gavil, Secondary Line Price Discrimination and the Fate of Morton Salt: To
Save It, Let It Go, 48 EMORY L.J. 1057, 1116-20 (1999) (discussing the problems with judicial
interpretations of secondary-line price discrimination).
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opportunity to compete for the contracted business. A nonprice contractual
term that requires one party to deal exclusively with the other party
forecloses some percentage of the market to rivals if the rivals are unable to
offer their own exclusive dealing contracts. A contractual provision that
offers a discount to incentivize the customer to do business forecloses
rivals only if the rivals could not profitably offer their own competitive
discounts.
If the restraint involves contractual terms that span multiple products
(as in the case of tying and bundled discounting), it is necessary to identify
one or more markets in which competition is potentially harmed. Once that
market is identified, the question becomes how much of that market the
contractual arrangement in question places off limits to rivals. If the
contractual arrangement is a price discount, then none of the relevant
markets should be deemed off limits to rivals unless the rivals would have
to price below cost in order to obtain that business. But once some portion
of business in that market is deemed foreclosed-either because a party has
contractually committed or because the discounts impacting that segment
of business could not be overcome without pricing below cost-we have
the foreclosure percentage. At that point a court or agency should ask the
second question: Is the foreclosure substantial?
In performing a foreclosure analysis, it should not matter whether the
foreclosure occurs at the level of the upstream firm (usually a
manufacturer) or the downstream firm (usually a wholesaler or retailer).
For example, in a primary-line price discrimination case, the question
should be whether the manufacturer priced below cost, and, if so, whether
the below-cost pricing was across a sufficient share of the market to
substantially foreclose competition. Similarly, in a secondary-line case, the
question should be whether the retailer that received the discriminatory
price obtained such a competitive advantage that rivals could not profitably
compete for some segment of retail sales.
Second, is the foreclosure substantial? Once a court or agency
determines that some portion of the market is foreclosed, it must decide
whether the foreclosure is substantial. To date, judicial precedents that have
analyzed substantiality have usually fallen back on generic market share
percentages that bear little or no relationship to the significant economic
questions. In economic terms, a foreclosure percentage should be deemed
substantial when it denies rivals a sufficient probability of obtaining a
sufficient amount of business to reach the percentage of the market
necessary to minimize average costs ("minimum viable scale"). This
analysis requires identifying not only the minimum viable scale, but also
608 [Vol. 84:605
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the probability that the rival will win that particular increment of business
in the unforeclosed segment of the market. In performing this analysis, a
court or agency needs to consider both the role of an incumbency
advantage and the countervailing claim-usually made by ostensibly
frustrated new entrants-that the new entrant's technology, product, or
service is superior to the status quo.
Third, is the substantial foreclosure justified by efficiency defenses?
Even if a vertical restraint results in substantial foreclosure, it should not be
declared unlawful if efficiencies resulting from the restraint and passed on
to consumers exceed its anticompetitive effects.4
We organize this Article as follows. In Part II, we provide the
foundational assumptions for a unified theory of exclusionary vertical
restraints. In particular, we explore some differences between exclusion-
based theories of vertical restraints-those with which this Article is
concerned-and collusion- or exploitation-based theories-which we do
not address here. We also discuss the importance of unifying the approach
to vertical restraints in the United States and the European Union given the
increasingly transatlantic or global nature of many commercial practices
that may be challenged as exclusionary vertical restraints. In Part II, we
survey the leading U.S. and E.U. precedents and diagnose the sources of
the doctrinal and analytical incoherence. In Part IV, we advance our central
normative claim-that all exclusionary vertical restraints should be
analyzed prima facie within a broad and circumstantially adaptive two-part
framework centering on foreclosure and substantiality.5 We also assign
economic content to those elements. We do not analyze efficiencies
defenses in vertical restraints cases, but simply observe that such defenses
should not come into play unless a plaintiff meets the prima facie
substantial foreclosure test. Finally, in Part V, we provide illustrations of
our unified theory in action in the context of three significant vertical
restraints cases. In Part VI we conclude.
4. Since this Article is not primarily concerned with efficiencies defenses, we do not address the
proper treatment of efficiencies that are captured by producers and not passed onto consumers. See, e.g.,
Oliver E. Williamson, Economies as an Antitrust Defense: The Welfare Tradeoffs, 58 AM. ECON. REV.
18, 21-33 (1968).
5. We do not address efficiencies defenses that should arise once the plaintiff makes a prima
facie showing of substantial foreclosure.
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II. FOUNDATIONAL ASSUMPTIONS
A. DISTINGUISHING EXCLUSION, COLLUSION, AND EXPLOITATION
Antitrust law may prohibit vertical restraints for three quite different
kinds of reasons. First, vertical restraints have the capacity to exclude rivals
from effectively competing in some market, usually an upstream (or
supply) market or downstream (or resale) market. Second, vertical
restraints may facilitate collusion between firms at either the upstream or
downstream level.6 For example, colluding retailers may force upstream
suppliers to impose resale price maintenance in vertical contracts in order
to prevent cheating on the retail-level cartel agreement.7 Finally, a
dominant upstream firm may use vertical contractual practices such as
tying, bundling, or exclusive dealing to engage in price discrimination and
hence to extract consumer surplus from purchasers.8
This Article concerns only the first of these concerns-exclusionary
vertical restraints. Collusive theories of vertical restraints raise very
different concerns. Collusive vertical restraints are usually manifested as
intrabrand restrictions, such as resale price maintenance or territorial
restrictions. 9 Conversely, exclusionary vertical restraints usually operate as
interbrand restrictions, such as prohibitions on carrying a competing brand
or a tying arrangement that locks out competitive sellers. Furthermore,
collusive restraints often occur when the colluding firms have little market
power individually and hence must band together to thwart competition.' 0
By contrast, exclusionary vertical restraints are likely to be practiced only
by dominant firms with large market shares. Similarly, collusive restraints
involve no market foreclosure'"-indeed, collusion makes entry by new
6. See Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 892-93 (2007);
RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 171-73 (2d ed. 2001); Howard P. Marvel & Stephen
McCafferty, The Welfare Effects ofResale Price Maintenance, 28 J.L. & ECON. 363, 373-74 (1985).
7. Leegin, 551 U.S. at 893.
8. See Einer Elhauge, Tying, Bundled Discounts, and the Death of the Single Monopoly Profit
Theory, 123 HARV. L. REv. 397, 405-07 (2009).
9. Leegin, 551 U.S. at 903-04.
10. Market power is not a prerequisite for illegal price fixing. United States v. Socony-Vacuum
Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 252 (1940) ("Conspiracies under the Sherman Act .. . are not dependent on the
'doing of any act other than the act of conspiring' as a condition of liability."). The colluding firms
often have no individual market power at all.
11. It is, of course, possible that a group of dominant firms will collude to exclude rivals from
the market. Such cases, however, are best analyzed as instances of joint exclusion in which the market
power and foreclosure effects of the coconspirators are aggregated, rather than as instances of
noncoercive collusion. We consider multiparty cumulative foreclosure effects in Part V.C.
610 [Vol. 84:605
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firms easier since it increases market prices and reduces output.12 By
contrast, as we argue in Part IV, foreclosure is a necessary ingredient of
vertical exclusion.
Exploitation is also a very different concern from exclusion. While
exploitation also requires market power, it does not require that the market
power have been obtained through an exclusionary device. For example, a
firm with a valid exclusionary patent might engage in a form of
"exploitative" price discrimination.' 3 Additionally, exploitation operates
only vertically-it involves the extraction of surplus from a person or firm
at a different level of production or distribution from the exploiting firm.
By contrast, vertical exclusion devices employ vertical relations
instrumentally to exclude competitors, and hence operate horizontally. For
example, a firm that engages in predatory pricing lowers its prices to
consumers in order to exclude a competitor. Later, it increases its prices to
recoup the costs of predation and to earn monopoly profits.' 4 This latter act
of excessive pricing might be said to be "exploitative," but it is differently
exploitative from emerging theories of exploitation, which rely on the
manipulation of price structures to extract consumer welfare regardless of
any prior exclusion.' 5 Prior exclusion is not a necessary ingredient of an
exploitation theory, and exploitation is not a necessary consequence of an
exclusion strategy. Thus, exploitation is not anticompetitive in the
conventional sense in that it does not turn on avoiding competition.
There is also an important juridical difference between exclusion and
exploitation. It is doubtful whether U.S. antitrust law recognizes a pure
exploitation theory.16 By contrast, E.U. law does-at least in theory.17
Antitrust laws in many emerging antitrust jurisdictions also recognize
12. This is not to say that cartels automatically attract entry. If potential new entrants understand
that current prices are the product of collusion and that new entry will disrupt the patterns of collusion,
then they may not consider entry worthwhile. See Ariel Ezrachi & David Gilo, Are Excessive Prices
Really Self-Correcting?, 5 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 249, 255 (2009).
13. See, e.g., William F. Baxter, Legal Restrictions on Exploitation of the Patent Monopoly: An
Economic Analysis, 76 YALE L.J. 267, 280 (1966).
14. Daniel A. Crane, The Paradox ofPredatory Pricing, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 2-3 (2005).
15. See, e.g., Elhauge, supra note 8, at 405-07.
16. See Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. linkLine Commc'ns, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1109, 1118 (2009) (holding
that simply charging monopoly prices does not violate Section 2 of the Sherman Act).
17. In theory, Article 102 of the TFEU prohibits both exclusionary and exploitative abuses of
dominance, although successful cases challenging abuses of dominance on pure exploitation theories
are rare. John Vickers, Abuse of Market Power, 115 ECON. J. F244, F246 (2005) ("All but a few
[European Commission] cases on abuse of dominance have concerned exclusionary conduct by
dominant firms-i.e. conduct preventing or restricting competitors-rather than behaviour directly
exploitative of consumers.").
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stand-alone exploitation offenses, such as excessive pricing and
nonexclusionary price discrimination.' 8
Although the conceptual foundations of these three separate theories
of vertical restraint are quite different, antitrust law often fails to
distinguish clearly which theory of wrong it is addressing with a particular
analytic matrix. For example, tying arrangements may be anticompetitive
because they exclude competitors,' 9 facilitate cartel arrangements, 20 or
extract surplus from consumers.21 Antitrust law, however, often approaches
tying as a unified legal wrong amenable to a single test. For instance, under
U.S. case law, a seller's share of the tying market must generally be at least
30 to 40 percent in order for the tying to be illegal.22 But a single market
share screen makes little sense in light of the different possible theories of
wrong. If the tie-in is wrongful because it excludes competitors in the tied
market, then a fairly high degree of market power in the tying market is
likely necessary. If it is wrongful because it represents a cartel-stabilization
effort, then a much lower market share might be sufficient.
Although this Article does not propose an analytic framework for
collusive or exploitative theories of harm, one implication of the
framework we propose for exclusionary theories is that the plaintiff in a
vertical restraints case should be required to articulate with precision which
theory it is advancing. The relevant analytical questions in exclusion,
collusion, and exploitation cases are quite different. While adopting a
unified theory of exclusionary vertical restraints is reasonable, adopting a
unified theory of vertical restraints is nonsensical.
18. See generally ELEANOR M. Fox & DANIEL A. CRANE, GLOBAL ISSUES IN ANTITRUST AND
COMPETITION LAW 95-122 (2010) (providing an overview of exploitative offenses such as excessive
and discriminatory pricing).
19. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 482-85 (1992)
(examining elements of a tying claim brought under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, which concerns
monopolization).
20. See Christopher R. Leslie, Tying Conspiracies, 48 WM. & MARY L. REv. 2247, 2256-60
(2007).
21. Elhauge, supra note 8, at 407-13.
22. See Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 26 & n.43 (1984) (holding that
Jefferson Parish did not occupy a dominant market position with only 30 percent of the market share);
Times-Picayune Publ'g Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 611-13 (1953) (holding that Times-
Picayune did not occupy a dominant position in the newspaper advertising market with only 40 percent
of the market share).
612 [Vol. 84:605
EXCLUSIONARY VERTICAL RESTRAINTS
B. THE NEED AND OPPORTUNITY FOR A UNIFIED TRANSATLANTIC
APPROACH
Divergences in U.S. and E.U. treatment of exclusionary vertical
restraints are unexceptional since U.S. and E.U. competition laws differ in
many important respects.23 Nonetheless, there are at least three compelling
reasons for articulating a theory capable of unifying and rationalizing the
law of exclusionary vertical restraints in both jurisdictions.
First, as we shall note in the following section, the existing bodies of
U.S. and E.U. law on exclusionary vertical restraints do not just conflict
with each other, but are each internally incoherent and in need of
systematization within a coherent economic framework. There is no good
reason to systematize the two bodies differently. While the foundational
legal instruments of the two systems (the U.S. statutes and E.U. treaty
provisions) imply different approaches on certain vertical issues-such as
exploitative uses of market power or intrabrand restraints that segment the
common European market at national borders 24-they do not require
different approaches to exclusionary vertical restraints.
To the extent that the two jurisdictions differ on matters of
emphasis-for example, the relative priority given to short-run or long-run
effects or default assumptions in the absence of clear proof-such
differences can be expressed within the unified framework we propose. For
example, some commentators believe that E.U. law tends to give priority to
short-run consumer pricing effects over long-run interests in innovation. 25
23. See Eleanor M. Fox, GE/Honeywell: The U.S. Merger That Europe Stopped-A Story of the
Politics of Convergence, in ANTITRUST STORIES 331, 333-36 (Eleanor M. Fox & Daniel A. Crane eds.,
2007) (comparing American and European merger law). See generally Heike Schweitzer, Parallels and
Differences in the Attitudes Towards Single-Firm Conduct: What Are the Reasons? The History,
Interpretation and Underlying Principles of Sec. 2 Sherman Act and Art. 82 EC (EUI Working Papers,
LAW 2007/32, 2007) (explaining differences between American and European views of antitrust laws
and single-firm conduct).
24. See Nicola Giocoli, Competition Versus Property Rights: American Antitrust Law, The
Freihurg School, and the Early Years of European Competition Policy, 5 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON.
747, 779-80 (2009) (explaining European hostility to intrabrand vertical restraints as grounded in
common market objectives); Ilene Knable Gotts et al., Nature vs. Nurture and Reaching the Age of
Reason: The U.S/E.U. Treatment of Transatlantic Mergers, 61 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 453, 471-72
(2005) (describing European concern about vertical restraints with regard to such agreements' impact
on cross-border markets).
25. See, e.g., Alan Devlin & Michael Jacobs, Microsoft's Five Fatal Flaws, 2009 COLUM. BUS.
L. REv. 67, 71 (describing "Europe's jurisprudential thinking" as "an unequivocal embrace of short-run
consumer wealth at the possible expense of long-run innovation"); J. Bruce McDonald, Deputy
Assistant Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, Antitrust Div., Presentation to the Modernisation of
Article 82 Conference: Section 2 and Article 82: Cowboys and Gentlemen 12 (June 16-17, 2005),
6132011]
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The relative priority of those two competing interests can be expressed
during the balancing of anticompetitive effects against offsetting
efficiencies. Differences in the relative weights accorded to each interest
between the different jurisdictions, however, do not negate the substantial
foreclosure framework for ascertaining whether a vertical restraint even
excludes any rival.
Second, an increasing number of exclusionary vertical restraints cases
involve commercial practices by dominant suppliers that span both
American and European markets. Recent parallel cases in the United States
and European Union against Intel26 and Microsoft 27 have exposed
significant analytical differences between the U.S. and E.U. approaches
with respect to the same commercial practices involving the same
competitors and business customers. For example, the European
Commission ("Commission") insisted that Microsoft "unbundle[]" its
Personal Computer ("PC") operating system (Windows) from its media
player.28 The E.U. decision effectively required Microsoft to redesign its
operating system for the European market since Microsoft was permitted to
carry the "bundled" version of Windows in the rest of the world. In 2005,
Microsoft complied with the European Union's decision and began to make
available "Windows XP Home Edition N," with the "N" conspicuously and
clumsily-as if to make the point-standing for "not with Media Player." 29
Although the European Court of First Instance eventually affirmed the
Commission's decision,30 "Edition N" proved highly unpopular with
original equipment manufacturers serving the European market, and very
few installed it on their computers. Microsoft thus redesigned its operating
available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/210873.pdf ("Relative to EU officials U.S.
enforcers exhibit greater attention to the long run and greater faith in the market's ability to police long
run problems.").
26. See infra text accompanying notes 156-97.
27. An examination of the various cases against Microsoft appears in WILLIAM H. PAGE & JOHN
E. LOPATKA, THE MICROSOFT CASE: ANTITRUST, HIGH TECHNOLOGY, AND CONSUMER WELFARE 33-
83 (2007). See also infra text accompanying notes 107-11.
28. Commission Decision 2007/53/EC of 24 March 2004 Relating to a Proceeding Pursuant to
Article 82 of the EC Treaty and Article 54 of the EEA Agreement Against Microsoft Corporation
(COMP/C-3/37.792-Microsoft), 2007 O.J. (L 32) 23, 27.
29. Microsoft Strikes Deal on Windows, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 2005, at C8 (reporting on the
agreement on the name of the new product, clearing the way for its distribution); Press Release,
Microsoft News Ctr., Microsoft to Release Windows XP Home Edition N and Windows XP
Professional N in Europe (June 8, 2005), http://www.microsoft.com/presspass/press/2005/jun05/06-
08XPNEuropePR.mspx ("[T]he latest versions of the XP operating systems without Windows Media
Player follow further clarifications from the European Commission.").
30. Case T-201/04, Microsoft Corp. v. Comm'n, 2007 E.C.R. 11-3601, 9 866-69.
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system for the European market, only to find no takers.' A unified
approach to exclusionary vertical restraints in the United States and
European Union might not have avoided this debacle since a common
analytical framework does not guarantee identical application in both
jurisdictions. It would, however, reduce the likelihood of similar
occurrences in the future.
Third, the time is ripe for a comprehensive examination of vertical
restraints policy. In the United States, the law governing a wide variety of
exclusionary vertical practices-including bundled discounting, exclusive
dealing, tying, and secondary-line price discrimination-is currently under
debate in the courts and the academy. Judge Richard Posner has opined that
"[a]ntitrust policy toward vertical restraints is the biggest substantive issue
facing antitrust."32 In Europe, the Commission announced its intention to
move from a formalistic or "form-based" approach to abuse of dominance
issues to an "effects-based" approach.33 This shift in approach may
facilitate moving vertical restraints policy into a unified economic
framework. While both jurisdictions struggle with the same issues and
increasingly rely on economic analysis-which has no juridical borders-
the possibility of convergence is enhanced.
III. U.S. AND E.U. PRECEDENTS
A. U.S. PRECEDENTS
In the United States, courts typically analyze exclusionary vertical
restraints under one of five statutory provisions: Section 1 of the Sherman
Act, which prohibits contract, combinations, and conspiracies in restraint of
trade;34 Section 2 of the Sherman Act, which prohibits monopolizing; 35
31. See Steve Lohr & James Kanter, Microsoft Facing Fines in Europe, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23,
2005, at Cl (reporting that according to Microsoft no original equipment manufacturers have asked for
licenses for the product and retail sales "have been few"); Paul Meller, Microsoft in European Court
Says 2004 Ruling Is a Failure, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 26, 2006, at C6 (reporting an admission from the top
Commission lawyer stating, "I am afraid we cannot say our remedy has had any real impact, as far as
we can see").
32. Richard A. Posner, Vertical Restraints and Antitrust Policy, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 229, 229
(2005).
33. See Neelie Kroes, Member, European Comm'n in Charge of Competition Policy, Speech at
the Fordham Corporate Law Institute: Preliminary Thoughts on Policy Review of Article 82, at 2 (Sept.
23, 2005), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/05/537
(advocating an effects-based approach to Article 82 enforcement).
34. Sherman Act § 1, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006).
35. Id. § 2.
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Section 3 of the Clayton Act, which prohibits anticompetitive tying and
exclusive dealing;36  the Robinson-Patman Act, which prohibits
anticompetitive price discrimination; 37 and Section 5 of the Federal Trade
Commission Act, which empowers the Federal Trade Commission to
prohibit unfair methods of competition. 38 Rather than following statutory
lines, the courts have largely divided exclusionary vertical restraints into
classes of commercial conduct that overlap statutory categories. For
example, courts consider primary-line price discrimination under the
Robinson-Patman Act to be functionally equivalent to predatory pricing
under the Sherman Act, but consider secondary-line price discrimination
under the Robinson-Patman Act to be a separate offense from primary-line
price discrimination.39 Tying offenses are cognizable under Section 3 of the
Clayton Act or Sections 1 or 2 of the Sherman Act, without much
distinction between the statutory sources.40
Although the courts have largely treated the causes of action
associated with potentially anticompetitive vertical restraints to apply
regardless of the statutory provision invoked by the plaintiff, they have
often abandoned this functional approach when addressing different forms
of exclusionary vertical restraints. Instead, they have created either
formalist or functionalist doctrines depending on the type of restraint at
issue. In many cases, the courts have treated similar forms of vertical
restraints quite differently based on insubstantial classificatory distinctions.
In particular, the courts have treated as unjustifiably significant the
distinctions between single-product and multiproduct practices, primary-
and secondary-line effects, and price or nonprice terms of sale or exchange.
Significant doctrinal differences between the treatment of tying
36. Clayton Act § 3, 15 U.S.C. § 14.
37. Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 13a, 13b, 21a.
38. Federal Trade Commission Act § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 45.
39. See 14 HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES
AND THEIR APPLICATION 1 2300, at 3 (1999). Primary- and secondary-line price discrimination under
the Robinson-Patman Act overlap on many statutory elements-such as the "roughly
contemporaneous" "sales" of "commodities," and "of like grade and quality" requirements, id.
(footnotes omitted), but those statutory elements have little to do with the economic substance of the
antitrust analysis.
40. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 481 (1992)
(acknowledging that "[m]onopoly power under § 2 requires, of course, something greater than market
power under § 1," but othenvise reaching the same conclusions about tying conduct under both Sections
I and 2 of the Sherman Act); Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 24 n.39 (1984)
("(W]ith respect to the definition of tying[,] the standards used by the two statutes[-the Clayton Act
and section I of the Sherman Act-]are the same.").
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(which necessarily involves two products) and exclusive dealing (which
need only involve one product) exemplify the overemphasis on the
differences between single- and multiproduct practices. Often, the same
conduct could be described as either tying or exclusive dealing.41 For
example, in the Standard Stations case, the Justice Department challenged
Standard Oil's requirement that independent gasoline retailers sell only
Standard's oil as an exclusive dealing requirement. 42 As Herbert
Hovenkamp has noted, however, the arrangement "could also have been
described as a tying arrangement in which the franchise itself, or the right
to bear the Standard brand, or the right to use tanks and pumps that
Standard provided its dealers was conditioned on their purchase of gasoline
from Standard." 4 3 Similarly, in Jefferson Parish Hospital District No. 2 v.
Hyde, five Justices saw a hospital's agreement to use a single
anesthesiology service as a tying arrangement (albeit a legal one),44
whereas four concurring Justices characterized it as a species of exclusive
dealing arrangement.45
Whether an arrangement is characterized as tying or exclusive dealing
has important implications under U.S. law, since courts have traditionally
treated tying arrangements with considerably greater hostility-more
formally and categorically-than exclusive dealing arrangements.4 6 But, to
the extent that the concern in tying cases is over the exclusion of rivals in
the tied market and not exploitation of consumers through price
discrimination,47 the exclusionary effects of tying and exclusive dealing
depend equally on the foreclosure of rivals. Indeed, if anything, tying
arrangements may generally be less threatening to rivals in the tied market
than exclusive dealing arrangements, since tying arrangements often apply
to only particular uses of the product in the tied market (for example, in
conjunction with a particular machine), whereas exclusive dealing contracts
forbid the buyer from purchasing any of its requirements from the seller's
41. 11 HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND
THEIR APPLICATION I 1800b, at 7 (2d ed. 2005) (distinguishing causes of action for tying and exclusive
dealing and observing that "[m]any of the practices that have been characterized as exclusive dealing
could also be described as tying, although perhaps not all the of the [sic] technical legal requirements
for a tying arrangement could be met").
42. Standard Oil Co. of Cal. v. United States (Standard Stations), 337 U.S. 293, 294 (1949).
43. 11 HOVENKAMP, supra note 41,1 1800b, at 7.
44. Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 22-24, 31-32.
45. Id. at 44-46 (O'Connor, J., concurring). See also II HOVENKAMP, supra note 41, 1 1800b, at
7 (citing Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. 2).
46. See II HOVENKAMP,supra note 41, T 1800b, at 10.
47. See Elhauge, supra note 8, at 399-400.
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rivals. 4 8 This is not to say that tying arrangements should be treated with
greater leniency than exclusive dealing arrangements-only that in either
case, the first step is to evaluate how much of the relevant market is
foreclosed to competitors.
Some courts have drawn a similar dividing line between single-
product predatory pricing and multiproduct bundled discounting.49 in
LePage's Inc. v. 3M, for example, an en banc panel of the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit held that bundled discounting should not be
governed by single-product predatory pricing rules but instead should be
analogized to tying arrangements "whose foreclosure effects are similar."50
That characterization was problematic. While recognizing the analytical
similarity between price and nonprice practices (bundled discounting and
tying), the Third Circuit assumed that a bundled discount forecloses rivals
in a significantly different manner from single-product predation. As we
shall show in the following section, in both single-product and
multiproduct discounting contexts, a competitor is foreclosed only if it
cannot reasonably match its rivals' prices. While the precise questions
necessary to ascertain whether this characterization is true may vary
depending on whether single- or multiproduct discounting is at issue, the
fundamental foreclosure issue is the same.
A second manifestation of doctrinal and analytical incoherence
concerns the radically different treatment accorded to primary-line and
secondary-line price discrimination. As previously noted, under U.S. law
primary-line price discrimination (which concerns injury to competition at
the level of the firm giving the discount-usually a manufacturer) is
addressed under the same standards as predatory pricing under the Sherman
Act. To satisfy its prima facie case, the plaintiff must show that the
defendant priced below the "appropriate measure of its rival's cost,"5' and
that its conduct created a "dangerous probability" that the defendant would
later be able to recoup its costs of predation through supracompetitive
48. 11 HOVENKAMP, supra note 41, 1 1800b, at 10-11.
49. A bundled discount involves the seller's offer to sell two or more products at a discounted
package price, even though the seller is still willing to make the two products available for individual
purchase. See Daniel A. Crane, Mixed Bundling, Profit Sacrifice, and Consumer Welfare, 55 EMORY
L.J. 423,425 (2006).
50. LePage's Inc. v. 3M, 324 F.3d 141, 155 (3d Cir. 2003) (en banc) (quoting PHILLIP E.
AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND
THEIR APPLICATION T 749, at 83 (Supp. 2002)) ("Rather than analogizing [bundled discounts] to
predatory pricing, [bundled discounts] are best compared with tying, whose foreclosure effects are
similar.").
51. Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 222 (1993).
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pricing.52  Under U.S. case law, however, secondary-line price
discrimination (which concerns injury to competition at the level of the
firm receiving the discount-usually a dealer) is an odd and aberrational
antitrust offense. There is no requirement that the firm giving the discount
have market power,53 nor any requirement of general injury to the
competitive process-an injury to a single competitor may be sufficient.54
There is not even a requirement that the discriminatory price have
threatened the disadvantaged firm's existence in the market.55
In its most recent secondary-line case, the Supreme Court signaled a
potential willingness to change course and harmonize secondary-line price
discrimination with the broader currents of antitrust law that are focused on
the protection of the competitive process rather than on individual
competitors. 56 To do this, the Court will need to revise significantly
secondary-line price discrimination doctrine to introduce analytical tools of
the kind that are employed in primary-line cases. In particular, it will need
to articulate the questions that judges and juries should ask in determining
whether a discriminatory discount to one dealer impaired that dealer's
rivals' ability to compete efficiently in the market. As set forth in the
following section, that inquiry should depend upon the same kind of
showing currently required in predatory pricing and primary-line cases-
that the rival dealer would have had to sell its goods below cost in order to
compete and, hence, was foreclosed from some segment of the relevant
market.
This latter observation raises a third branch of inconsistency in U.S.
treatment of exclusionary vertical restraints. As already noted, the plaintiff
in a predatory pricing case must show that the defendant priced below cost.
Any below-cost sales are considered off limits to an equally efficient rival
and, hence, anticompetitive. At that point, the analysis in exclusive dealing
and predatory pricing cases seems to converge on the foreclosure effect of
the vertical restraint. In exclusive dealing cases, however, foreclosure is
52. Id at 224.
53. 14 HOVENKAMP, supra note 39, 1 2301b, at 7-8. See also Texaco, Inc. v. Hasbrouck, 496
U.S. 543, 548 (1990) (describing the retail gasoline market as "highly competitive").
54. See Chroma Lighting v. GTE Prods. Corp., Ill F.3d 653, 654-55 (9th Cir. 1997); Rebel Oil
Co. v. AtI. Richfield Co., 51 F.3d 1421, 1445 (9th Cir. 1995).
55. See FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37, 48-51 (1948); 14 HOVENKAMP, supra note 39,
1 2331c, at 80-82,1 2333c, at 97-102.
56. Volvo Trucks N. Am., Inc. v. Reeder-Simco GMC, Inc., 546 U.S. 164, 181 (2006) ("[W]e
would resist interpretation [of the Robinson-Patman Act] geared more to the protection of existing
competitors than to the stimulation of competition.").
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only one ingredient. In order for the foreclosure to be illegal, it must be
"substantial."s? Trivial amounts of foreclosure through exclusive dealing
do not exclude rivals. The same is true of predatory pricing. Trivial
amounts of predatory pricing-say, below-cost pricing on just one or two
contracts in a market with hundreds of customers-cannot exclude rivals.
Predation can only exclude rivals if it forecloses them from so much of the
market that they cannot efficiently remain in the market. Under U.S. case
law, however, "substantiality" is not identified as an element of a predatory
pricing claim. Some courts have rejected predatory pricing claims in which
the plaintiff offered only selective evidence of predation or failed to show
below-cost pricing across the defendant's entire product line," but the
courts have not articulated a systematic principle of substantiality in
predatory pricing cases and, at times, have allowed plaintiffs to proceed on
evidence of selective predation without a showing of overall market
foreclosure. 59 Although the foreclosure effects of price and nonprice
vertical restraints are often analytically identical, extant doctrine treats
price and nonprice as completely distinct offenses.
In sum, U.S. case law contains no general theory of exclusionary
vertical restraints. It tends to muddle through on a practice-by-practice
basis, sometimes drawing weak analogies to, other times weak distinctions
from, other forms of vertical restraints. These distinctions are not justified
by any general theory of exclusionary conduct or any statutory imperative.
Rather, they are the products of uneven evolution of economic
understanding and path dependence based on the happenstance of how
cases were presented to and decided by courts, often generations ago.
B. E.U. PRECEDENTS
Vertical restraints analysis under E.U. competition law exhibits
similar incoherence. As with the United States, it is possible to identify
three sources of incoherence. The first concerns the different legal
treatment of the same practice depending on which section of the Treaty on
the Functioning of the European Union ("TFEU") is applied. The second
57. Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320, 328 (1961).
58. E.g., Vollrath Co. v. Sammi Corp., 9 F.3d 1455, 1461 (9th Cir. 1993); Morgan v. Ponder, 892
F.2d 1355, 1361-62 (8th Cir. 1989); Stitt Spark Plug Co. v. Champion Spark Plug Co., 840 F.2d 1253,
1256 (5th Cir. 1988); Directory Sales Mgmt. Corp. v. Ohio Bell Tel. Co., 833 F.2d 606, 613-14 (6th
Cir. 1987); Lomar Wholesale Grocery, Inc. v. Dieter's Gourmet Foods, Inc., 824 F.2d 582, 597-98 (8th
Cir. 1987); Bayou Bottling, Inc. v. Dr. Pepper Co., 725 F.2d 300, 305 (5th Cir. 1984); Janich Bros. v.
Am. Distilling Co., 570 F.2d 848, 856-57 (9th Cir. 1977).
59. See, e.g., C.E. Servs., Inc. v. Control Data Corp., 759 F.2d 1241, 1247 (5th Cir. 1985).
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relates to the different treatment of practices having similar economic
effects based on superficial differences in the challenged conduct. The third
involves the still-unclear interpretation of the concept of anticompetitive
foreclosure. Clarifying these ambiguities is necessary for establishing a
consistent framework of analysis, providing predictable standards for firms,
and promoting consumer welfare.
An initial source of analytical incoherence has textual roots, although
it is doubtful that the textual differences require the degree of analytical
difference reflected in judicial decisions. The texts of the articles in the
TFEU dealing with competition policy imply a different approach to the
treatment of concerted or joint practices 60 on the one hand, and unilateral
conduct on the other. This difference is reflected in two textual provisions
that apply exclusively to concerted practices. First, under Article 101(1),
the provision relating to concerted practices, only agreements that "may
affect trade between Member States and which have as their object or
effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the
internal market" are considered anticompetitive. 61 An assessment of
foreclosure is intrinsically required. Second, even if a concerted practice
triggers scrutiny under Article 101(1), Article 101(3)62 permits justifying
any such practice on efficiency grounds. 63
Article 102, dealing with unilateral conduct, refers to the illegality of
an abuse of dominant position in the relevant market.' The TFEU's text
allows no ex post justification of a practice deemed abusive, nor does it
require an analysis of anticompetitive effects. Justifications are permitted,
60. By "concerted practice" we refer to the meeting of wills in the form of an agreement as
opposed to the unilateral conduct deployed by a single undertaking.
61. TFEU, supra note 1, art. 101(1), at 88.
62. Article 101(3) of the TFEU states the following:
The provisions of paragraph I may, however, be declared inapplicable in the case of: any
agreement or category of agreements between undertakings, any decision or category of
decisions by associations of undertakings, any concerted practice or category of concerted
practices, which contributes to improving the production or distribution of goods or to
promoting technical or economic progress, while allowing consumers a fair share of the
resulting benefit, and which does not: (a) impose on the undertakings concerned restrictions
which are not indispensable to the attainment of these objectives; (b) afford such undertakings
the possibility of eliminating competition in respect of a substantial part of the products in
question.
Id. art. 101(3), at 89. This provision is further developed in Communication from the Commission,
Notice, Guidelines on the Application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty, 2004 O.J. (C 101) 97 (discussing
the application of Article 101(3)).
63. Case T-17/93, Matra Hachette SA v. Comm'n, 1994 E.C.R. 11-595, 85 ("[N]o anti-
competitive practice can exist which, whatever the extent of its effects on a given market, cannot be
exempted [under Article 101(3)].").
64. See Case 85/76, Hoffmann-La Roche & Co. AG v. Comm'n, 1979 E.C.R. 461, 91.
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if at all, in the threshold assessment of whether a practice is abusive at all.65
From this difference in the Treaty texts, courts have extrapolated
significant consequences. The same or very similar practices could often be
analyzed either as an abuse of dominance or as a concerted practice, with
dramatically different results.66
European jurisprudence under Article 101 has followed a similar
analytical distinction to the dichotomous categorization under U.S. law by
adjudging some restraints as hardcore violations that are per se illegal and
all other restraints under an effects-based rule of reason. 67 By reflecting
Article 101's prohibition on restraints that restrict competition as either
"object or effect," European courts have developed separate analytical
approaches for "restraints by object" and "restraints by effect." Since its
earliest cases, the European Court of Justice ("ECJ"), now the Court of
Justice of the European Union ("CJEU"), has analyzed vertical restraints as
possible restrictions of competition by effect rather than by object, unless a
clear anticompetitive intent was present.6 8 Practically, this approach has
meant that most vertical restraints are analyzed for their foreclosure effects
when scrutinized under Article 101.
The same is not true under Article 102. Unlike in Article 101 cases,
the European authorities have not felt compelled to look at the effects of a
given practice once it had been tagged as an anticompetitive practice
performed by a dominant firm. 69 The General Court ("GC"), formerly
65. Case C-53/03, Syfait v. GlaxoSmithKline AEVE, 2005 E.C.R. 1-4609, 172.
66. See Frank H. Easterbrook, When Is It Worthwhile to Use Courts to Search for Exclusionary
Conduct?, 2003 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 345, 345 ("Aggressive, competitive conduct by any firm, even
one with market power, is beneficial to consumers. Courts should prize and encourage it. Aggressive,
exclusionary conduct is deleterious to consumers, and courts should condemn it. The big problem lies in
this: competitive and exclusionary conduct look alike.").
67. This terminology, however, is not totally accurate. See RICHARD WHISH, COMPETITION LAW
131-32 (6th ed. 2009) (discussing the danger of importing those terms from U.S. law).
68. Case 56/65, Societ6 Technique Minibre v. Maschinenbau Ulm, 1966 E.C.R. 235, 250 ("[I]n
order to decide whether an agreement containing a clause 'granting an exclusive right of sale' is to be
considered as prohibited by reason of its object or its effect, it is appropriate to take into account in
particular the nature and quantity, limited or otherwise, of the products covered by the agreement, the
position and importance of the grantor and the concessionnaire on the market for the products
concerned, the isolated nature of the disputed agreement or, alternatively, its position in a series of
agreements, the severity of the clauses intended to protect the exclusive dealership or, alternatively, the
opportunities allowed for other commercial competitors in the same products by way of parallel re-
exportation and importation.").
69. See WHISH, supra note 67, at 194 (discussing the lack of a clear definition about what




known as the Court of First Instance, encapsulated this form-based
approach in Michelin II:
[F]or the purposes of applying Article [102], establishing the anti-
competitive object and the anti-competitive effect are one and the same
thing .... If it is shown that the object pursued by the conduct of an
undertaking in a dominant position is to limit competition, that conduct
will also be liable to have such an effect.70
This interpretation is particularly dangerous in the absence of a possible
exemption mirroring the one contained in Article 101(3), since even
restrictions of competition by object can theoretically be exempt under that
escape valve. If there are no genuine per se rules under Article 101, it is
hard to see the justification for such rules under Article 102.
The Stergios Delimitis v. Henninger Brdu AG decision articulates a
broad foreclosure test for exclusionary vertical restraints under Article
101.72 The Commission challenged an exclusive dealing contract between a
brewery and a reseller exploiting an outlet owned by that brewery. The
retailer agreed to carry only the brewer's products (beer and soft drinks), a
common form of agreement in the industry. The CJEU considered the
cumulative effects of these types of contracts on competition in the E.U.
market. Given that competitors' access to the market of beer consumption
was the key issue at stake, the court established that the effects of this
bundle of agreements depended mainly on the number of tied outlets in a
national territory, the duration of the commitments, and the quantities
involved in comparison with those sold by nontied outlets.73 The court
articulated a two-part test for such agreements: (1) access (whether the
agreement foreclosed market participation by rivals), and (2) the
significance of the agreement at issue.74 There was a clear assumption that
without market power, the efficiencies associated with a vertical restraint
would outweigh any anticompetitive effect, and that even in a context in
which similar agreements might have compromised competitors' ability to
compete in the relevant market, the agreement at issue was to be prohibited
only if it itself significantly contributed to this foreclosure.
70. Case T-203/01, Manufacture Frangaise des Pneumatiques Michelin v. Comm'n (Michelin 11),
2003 E.C.R. 11-4071, 1241 (citation omitted).
71. See Denis Waelbroeck, Michelin II: A Per Se Rule Against Rebates by Dominant
Companies?, 1 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 149, 153 (2005).
72. See Case C-234/89, Stergios Delimitis v. Henninger Br-iu AG, 1991 E.C.R. 1-935, 995.
73. Id.1 19.
74. Id. at 1-995.
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Delimitis provided a clear path for subsequent regulatory activity of
the Commission in similar Article 101 cases. When issuing block
exemptions for various categories of restraints of trade unlikely to harm
competition, the Commission has hewed to a foreclosure-based approach.
Under the De Minimis Notice, agreements by small- and medium-sized
undertakings below a given market-share threshold are deemed to lack an
appreciable impact on intracommunity trade or competition and therefore
do not fall under Article 101(1) of the TFEU, provided that they do not
touch on certain core restrictions of competition by object.7' The Vertical
Block Exemption Regulation ("vBER") refers to categories of vertical
agreements that, despite falling within the scope of Article 101(1), qualify
for an exemption under Article 101(3) of the TFEU because they are
presumed to satisfy its conditions with a sufficient degree of certainty.76
The key element of the presumption that the added efficiencies will
outweigh any possible anticompetitive effects is again the lack of
foreclosing effects. When neither the supplier nor the buyer has more than
a 30 percent market share and the agreement does not include any
nonindispensable obligations or hardcore restrictions, the block exemption
applies.
Although the effects-based approach under Article 101 works
relatively well when the Commission determines Article 101 applies,
trouble arises when initially determining which treaty provision to apply.
The Guidelines on Vertical Restraints ("GVR") as reformed in 2010
propose a four-step, effects-based assessment to determine whether an
undertaking falls within the vBER.77 The GVR specifies, however, that, in
principle, dominant undertakings cannot qualify for an exemption.
The GVR's implicit assumption is that vertical restraints by dominant
75. Commission Notice on Agreements of Minor Importance Which Do Not Appreciably
Restrict Competition Under Article 81(1) of the Treaty Establishing the European Community (De
Minimis), 2001 O.J. (C 368) 13, 13-14.
76. Commission Regulation 330/2010, The Application of Article 101(3) of the Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union to Categories of Vertical Agreements and Concerted Practices,
2010 0.J. (L 102) 1, 1.
77. Commission Notice, Guidelines on Vertical Restraints, 2010 O.J. (C 130) 1, 25. The
proposed methodology involves the following steps: (1) an initial definition of the relevant market in
order to assess (2) if the agreement falls within the scope of application of the vBER. If the relevant
market share is above 30 percent or, for any other reason, the presumption of compliance established in
the vBER does not apply to the agreement at issue, the next step (3) will establish if the agreement
restricts competition in the sense of Article 101(1) of the TFEU. Should the agreement fall within the
scope of application of Article 101(1), it will be determined (4) whether this restriction might be
outweighed by its associated efficiencies in the sense of Article 101(3). Id.
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firms shift into Article 102 territory, which entails a significant analytical
disconnect from Article 101 analysis. The classic definition of abuse of
dominance under Article 102, established by the CJEU in Hoffmann-La
Roche & Co. AG v. Commission, does not turn on efficiency or market
foreclosure but rather on a formalistic view of what constitutes competition
on the merits.78 This implies a rather awkward task considering that an
anticompetitive practice under Article 102 might be totally legitimate in the
absence of a finding of dominance. The European Community courts have
begun defining certain categories and subcategories of practices considered
abusive if performed by a dominant undertaking.
An example of this categorization is provided by the non-cost-related
analysis of a price-based practice such as rebates, also analyzed within
Article 101 under the heading of single-branding obligations as a quantity-
forcing device. In one of its early cases on abuse of dominance,
Codperatieve Vereniging 'Suiker Unie' UA v. Commission, the CJEU
established a general distinction leading to the dualist understanding of
quantity rebates as cost-justified (and thus procompetitive) versus loyalty-
enhancing rebates (and thus anticompetitive). 79 "[T]he fidelity rebate,
unlike quantity rebates exclusively linked with the volume of purchases
from the producer concerned, is designed through the grant of a financial
advantage to prevent customers from obtaining their supplies from
competing producers."so This formalistic categorization has prevailed from
initial cases characterized by the super-dominant position of the
incumbents-upon which the inference of market foreclosure was built-
up to more recent cases involving more controversial findings of
dominance.8 ' In 2003, the GC categorically stated that "it may be inferred
generally from the case-law that any loyalty-inducing rebate system applied
78. Case 85/76, Hoffinann-La Roche & Co. AG v. Comm'n, 1979 E.C.R. 461, 191 ("The
concept of abuse is an objective concept relating to the behaviour of an undertaking in a dominant
position which is such as to influence the structure of a market where, as a result of the very presence of
the undertaking in question, the degree of competition is weakened and which, through recourse to
methods different from those which condition normal competition in products or services on the basis
of the transactions of commercial operators, has the effect of hindering the maintenance of the degree of
competition still existing in the market or the growth of that competition.").
79. Joined Cases 40-48, 50, 54-56, 111, 113 & 114/73, Cooperatieve Vereniging 'Suiker Unie'
UA v. Comm'n, 1975 E.C.R. 1663, 1 518 ("[T]he rebate at issue is not to be treated as a quantity rebate
exclusively linked with the volume of purchases from the producer concerned but has rightly been
classified by the Commission as a 'loyalty' rebate designed, through the grant of a financial advantage,
to prevent customers obtaining their supplies from competing producers.").
80. Hoffnann-La Roche, 1979 E.C.R. 190.
81. For a chronological table of the market shares of the incumbents in cases of rebates defended
before the European community courts, see table in the Appendix, infra.
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by an undertaking in a dominant position has foreclosure effects prohibited
by Article [102 of the TFEU]."82
This position presents a problem of overall coherence because it leads
to two different standards for assessing rebates depending on which Article
is used to analyze them. Thus, while the effects-based assessment
performed under Article 101 takes into account the efficiencies associated
with rebate systems in the framework of single-branding vertical
restraints-hold-up, adverse selection, and moral hazard problems 83-the
inference of foreclosure in Michelin II was based on the assumption that,
other than a strict cost-related justification, no efficiencies can come from
such a system when enabled by a dominant undertaking. 84 Proving cost
justification is extremely difficult,"s which means that dominant firms face
a nearly irrebuttable presumption that certain practices foreclose and lack
any efficiency justification.
The second source of analytical confusion arises from the interaction
between the categorization inherent to the form-based approach under
Article 102 and the effects-based analysis under Article 101. When the
same practice is assessed under both norms, the divergences become
apparent-ultimately, the courts must apply different standards under
Article 102 to practices with very similar economic effects. The GC
provided an example of this internal lack of coherence with two decisions
delivered within one month of each other that adopted dissimilar
methodologies for assessing single branding obligations: one in the form of
price-based conduct (rebates), and another in the form of non-price-based
conduct (exclusive dealing).
In the Michelin II case, the court found that loyalty-inducing rebates
categorically have foreclosure effects when used by dominant firms.86 In
Van den Bergh Foods Ltd. v. Commission, however, the court applied a
82. Case T-203/01, Manufacture Frangaise des Pneumatiques Michelin v. Comm'n (Michelin II),
2003 E.C.R. 11-4071, 1 65.
83. The GVR establishes that single-branding obligations of up to 80 percent of a customer's
requirements will be lawful if "the supplier's and buyer's market share each do not exceed 30% and are
subject to a limitation in time of five years for the non-compete obligation." Commission Notice,
Guidelines on Vertical Restraints, 2010 O.J. (C 130) 1.
84. See Michelin II, 2003 E.C.R. ? 65.
85. European Communities Courts have consistently considered the cost-related justification
argued by the firms as too vague. E.g., id. T 108; Case T-219/99, British Airways PLC v. Comm'n,
2003 E.C.R. 11-5917, T 285, af'd, Case C-95/04, 2007 E.C.R. 1-2331.
86. Michelin II, 2003 E.C.R. T 56 ("[W]ith ... regard to the granting of rebates by an
undertaking in a dominant position,... a loyalty rebate ... is contrary to Article [102].").
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foreclosure-based effects analysis17 despite facing a firm with an even
greater market share than in Michelin JJ.88 The apparent difference was that
the Van den Bergh restraint did not directly involve price. In Van den
Bergh, the largest producer of ice cream in Ireland, HB, held a market
share of the impulse ice cream market over 75 percent" and distributed its
product through 40 percent of ice cream retailers. 90 The producer provided
freezer cabinets free of cost but specified that rivals' ice cream could not be
stored in its freezers. The GC found that this constituted a common practice
in the industry9' that did not foreclose competitors in an absolute way-as
a retailer could in theory sell other brands of ice cream if the retailer
installed additional freezers-but acted as an entry barrier that made rivals'
access to the market difficult because of the limited space available in the
outlets and the "unavoidable trad[e] partner" status of HB.92 The
Commission had condemned the practice under both Article 101 and 102.
As to Article 101, the Commission concluded that the exclusivity clause
contained in the agreements could not be exempted on the grounds of
Article 101(3).93 As to Article 102, the Commission concluded that HB's
practice constituted an abuse of its dominant position because it induced
retailers not to have other freezers in their outlets by offering HB's freezers
for free.94 The court upheld the Commission decision and, in order to
establish the foreclosure effects of HB's practice, carried out a detailed
analysis of both the market structure and the possible efficiencies of HB's
strategy.95 Even if the court accepted that an untied demand of 60 percent
of retailers did not allow it automatically to assume the existence of
anticompetitive foreclosure in the market, its analysis of the economic and
legal context of the agreement in the sense of Delimitis, and of the presence
of cumulative effects of similar contracts to which HB's agreements
87. See Case T-65/98, Van den Bergh Foods Ltd. v. Comm'n, 2003 E.C.R. 11-4653, 86, 104.
88. Compare id 121 (citing Commission Decision 98/53 of 11 March 1998 Relating to a
Proceeding Under Articles 85 and 86 of the EC Treaty (Van den Bergh Foods Ltd.), 1998 O.J. (L 246)
1, 45-46) (reporting HB's market share as being over 75 percent), and id. 90 (reporting HB's market
share as being 89 percent), with Commission Decision 2002/405/EC Relating to a Proceeding Pursuant
to Article 82 of the EC Treaty (COMP/E-2/36.041/PO--Michelin), 2002 O.J. (L 143) 1, 28 (reporting
Michelin's market share as being over 50 percent, but no estimate exceeding 65 percent).
89. Van den Bergh Foods, 2003 E.C.R. 1 21; Van den Bergh Foods, 1998 O.J. (L 246) at 45-46.
90. Van den Bergh Foods, 2003 E.C.R. 1 19.
91. Id. T1 18-19. Only 17 percent of Irish retailers had nonexclusive freezers compared to 83
percent of outlets at which a supplier had provided freezers with an exclusivity clause.
92. Id. 1154. See also id. 61-63.
93. Id. 120.
94. Id T 21-22.
95. See id. $T97-98.
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contributed significantly, led to the conclusion that the agreement was
likely to foreclose actual or potential competitors from the market of
impulse ice cream.96
The inconsistencies related to treating unilateral conduct made clear
the need to reassess the application of Article 102.97 In 2005, then-
European Commissioner Neelie Kroes announced the Commission's
intention to evolve from the traditional form-based approach to dominance
toward a case-by-case analysis of the actual or likely effects of dominant
firm conduct.98 The main tool for its implementation was to be the
construction of a specific theory of foreclosure that would evaluate whether
a given practice indeed had a distorting effect in the market, rather than
simply foreclosing one or two less efficient competitors. 99 Subsequently,
the Directorate-General for Competition commissioned a discussion paper
calling for a reinterpretation of the definition provided by the ECJ in
Hoffmann-La Roche that had served to substantiate the previous form-
based approach.' 00
The Commission then issued a Guidance Paper that announced that
the Commission's Article 102 enforcement priorities would be assessing
anticompetitive foreclosure as its central element.' 0' This concept is
defined as "a situation where effective access of actual or potential
competitors to supplies or markets is hampered or eliminated as a result of
the conduct of the dominant undertaking whereby the dominant
undertaking is likely to be in a position to profitably increase prices ... to
the detriment of consumers."l 02 The factors taken into account by the
Commission to assess the existence of anticompetitive foreclosure will be
96. See id. 171-73.
97. See JORDI GUAL ET AL., ECON. ADVISORY GRP. FOR COMPETITION POLICY, AN ECONOMIC
APPROACH TO ARTICLE 82, at 2 (2005).
98. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
99. Kroes, supra note 33, at 4.
100. Directorate-Geneneral for Competition, European Comm'n, DG Competition Discussion
Paper on the Application of Article 82 of the Treaty to Exclusionary Abuses, at 4-5, 18 (Dec. 2005),
available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/art82/discpaper2005.pdf.
101. Guidance on the Commission's Enforcement Priorities in Applying Article 82 of the EC
Treaty to Abusive Exclusionary Conduct by Dominant Undertakings, 2009 O.J. (C 45) 7, 7, 9-10.
102. Id. at 10 (footnote omitted). The Commission's intended definition of "increase prices" is
provided in paragraph 11:
[T]he expression 'increase prices' includes the power to maintain prices above the
competitive level and is used as shorthand for the various ways in which the parameters of
competition-such as prices, output, innovation, the variety or quality of goods or services-





(1) the strength of the incumbent's position; (2) the conditions of the
relevant market, particularly the conditions of entry and expansion; (3) the
position of the competitors, customers, and input suppliers; (4) the extent of
the allegedly abusive conduct; and (5) possible evidence of foreclosure as
well as direct evidence of any exclusionary strategy developed by the
incumbent.103 Furthermore, these factors will be supplemented by more
detailed criteria governing different species of exclusionary conducts.
Overall, the Guidance Paper is a sign of progress because it grants
similar treatment to price- and non-price-based conduct, thus recognizing
their similar economic effects. Although the Commission continues to deal
with single- and multiproduct rebates under the respective headings of
exclusive dealing and tying, and margin squeeze as instances of refusal to
deal, it lays down cost-based analyses for price-based conduct. For
example, predatory pricing, single- and multiproduct rebates, and margin
squeeze tests all focus on the potential for excluding equally efficient
competitors by forcing them to price below cost in order to compete.
Departing from the methodology applied by the ECJ to predatory pricing in
AKZO Chemie BV v. Commission,104 the Commission has moved to cost
benchmarks more suitable to the peculiarities of formerly regulated markets
and new high-tech industries.
Alas, despite the Guidance Paper's progress in moving vertical
restraints toward a more consistent economic framework, analytical
difficulties and confusions persist. For one, it is uncertain how the
European courts will receive the Commission's new approach. 0 5 More
fundamentally, there remains significant doubt as to the ability of courts
consistently to apply the approach to anticompetitive foreclosure.106
The trouble arises from the Commission's insistence that its approach
to anticompetitive foreclosure is not really new but was already used in
prior cases.' 0 7 For example, in Microsoft Corp. v. Commission, the
103. Id at 10.
104. Case C-62/86, AKZO Chemie BV v. Comm'n, 1991 E.C.R. 1-3359, TT 71-72 (holding that
prices below average avoidable costs will presumably be illegal while prices above average avoidable
costs but below average total costs will be illegal if they are part of a plan to exclude competitors).
105. See Giorgio Monti, Article 82 EC: What Future for the Effects-Based Approach?, J. EUR.
COMPETITION L. & PRAc. 2, 7-8 (2010).
106. Id. at 6-7.
107. Press Release, European Comm'n, Antitrust: Guidance on Commission Enforcement
Priorities in Applying Article 82 to Exclusionary Conduct by Dominant Firms-Frequently Asked
Questions (Dec. 3, 2008), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=
MEMO/08/76 I &format-HTML&aged=0&language-EN&guiLanguage=en.
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Commission conceded that it needed to prove foreclosure 108 and the GC
upheld its decision.109 The problem, however, was the construction given to
the foreclosure requirement. Microsoft argued that the claim of foreclosure
was entirely speculative and, indeed, belied by the factual record showing
an increase in the number and use of alternative media players."i0 The
court, however, countered that this
practice allowed Microsoft to obtain an unparalleled advantage with
respect to the distribution of its product and to ensure the ubiquity of
Windows Media Player on client PCs throughout the world, thus
providing a disincentive for users to make use of third-party media
players and for [Original Equipment Manufacturers] to pre-install such
players on client PCs. 111
Far from requiring proof of actual foreclosure, the court simply assumed it
existed from the nature of the practice. Should the Guidance Paper result in
a widespread approach akin to that employed by the GC in Microsoft, it
would represent little progress in transitioning away from a formalistic
approach toward an economically functionalist approach.
That would be regrettable because good economic tools for evaluating
foreclosure questions already exist within the praxis of E.U. competition
law, specifically in the Commission's Guidelines on Non-Horizontal
Mergers.11 2 In the section on noncoordinated anticompetitive effects of
vertical integration, the Guidelines analyze anticompetitive foreclosure
under a two-part test consisting of a definition of foreclosure as well as its
anticompetitive component:
A merger is said to result in foreclosure where actual or potential
rivals' access to supplies or markets is hampered or eliminated as a result
of the merger, thereby reducing these companies' ability and/or incentive
108. Case T-201/04, Microsoft Corp. v. Comm'n, 2007 E.C.R. 11-3601, 1 868 ("[T]he
Commission considered that, in light of the specific circumstances of the present case, it could not
merely assume, as it normally does in cases of abusing typing, that the tying of a specific product and a
dominant product has by its nature a foreclosure effect. The Commission therefore examined more
closely the actual effects which the bundling had already had on the streaming media player market and
also the way in which that market was likely to evolve.").
109. Id % 866-69.
110. Id. 1 1006 ("Microsoft claims that the average number of media players per person used each
month rose from 1.5 at the end of 1999 to 2.1 in 2004. The Commission's contention that the number of
users of Windows Media Player is increasing is irrelevant; what matters is whether the number of users
of other formats is sufficient for content providers to find it worthwhile to encode their products in
those formats.").
111. Id.11054.
112. Commission Guidelines on the Assessment of Non-Horizontal Mergers Under the Council
Regulation on the Control of Concentrations Between Undertakings, 2008 O.J. (C 265) 6.
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to compete. Such foreclosure may discourage entry or expansion of
rivals or encourage their exit. Foreclosure thus can be found even if the
foreclosed rivals are not forced to exit the market: It is sufficient that the
rivals are disadvantaged and consequently led to compete less
effectively. Such foreclosure is regarded as anti-competitive where the
merging companies-and, possibly, some of its competitors as well-are
as a result able to profitably increase the price charged to consumers.113
Significantly, the Guidelines distinguish between two types of
foreclosure entailing different competitive problems: input foreclosure and
customer foreclosure." 4 While input foreclosure might result in raising
rivals' costs by restricting the access of downstream competitors to some
necessary input, customer foreclosure occurs when upstream rivals' access
to customers is precluded.' 15 In terms of consumer harm, however, both
scenarios require balancing the efficiencies associated with the merger with
their possible anticompetitive effects. In both cases, three factors should be
considered simultaneously: (1) the ability and (2) the incentives to
foreclose upstream or downstream competitors, as well as (3) the likelihood
of this foreclosure having a "significant detrimental effect" on competition
(for input foreclosure) or consumers (for customer foreclosure) by
balancing pro- and anticompetitive effects.116
In the case of input foreclosure, upstream market power-while being
a precondition for the merged firm to establish the ability to foreclose-
will not necessarily imply an associated incentive to foreclose the
downstream market. This follows from the fact that the incentives to
foreclose will depend on the overall profitability of the merged firm: there
will be a tradeoff between the profits lost in the upstream market by not
selling to downstream competitors and the profits gained in the
downstream market from expanding sales or increasing prices. "7 High
margins in the upstream market and low margins downstream would
disincentivize the firm from enacting any input foreclosure and vice
versa." Therefore, an upstream monopolist already extracting all available
profits will lack the incentive to foreclose downstream competitors
regardless of its market power. Conversely, a firm with high downstream
market shares, particularly in combination with high margins, will likely
113. Id. 29.
114. Id. 130.
115. Id T 30-31, 58.
116. Id. 32, 59.
117. Id 40-41.
118. Id. % 42-43.
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benefit from increasing rivals' costs. Furthermore, the presence of
exclusivity commitments may represent an ambiguous factor to assess.
While exclusive contracts between the downstream merging firm and other
independent input suppliers may enhance the latter's ability to foreclose the
downstream market, the fact that vertical integration may help realign
purchase patterns and free other input suppliers should also be
considered. 19
For assessing customer foreclosure, the main concerns will also be
related to rising input prices but, in this case, as a consequence of the
incapacity of upstream actual or potential rivals to achieve minimum
production efficiency. This might be, for instance, a result of the
insufficient economies of scale or scope-should these be relevant-
associated with a larger client base. Moreover, the lack of expected returns
can further reduce the upstream competitor's willingness to invest in
becoming more efficient. Nevertheless, this possible foreclosure may lead
upstream rivals to counterstrategies, such as more aggressive pricing, in
order to maintain sales in the downstream market. In this sense, the
incentives to engage in customer foreclosure will again depend on its
overall profitability. Accordingly, a less efficient upstream division of the
integrated firm will entail higher costs of diverting input from other
suppliers. Further, the higher the market shares of the downstream division,
the more benefits flow from increasing downstream prices as a result of the
rise of upstream rivals' costs.120
In sum, the Guidelines represent a comprehensive functionalist
analysis of the conditions and effects of anticompetitive foreclosure. This
implies not only that all associated efficiencies are specifically recognized
by and generally referred to in the framework of vertical integration, but
also that the positive effects of practices such as tying and bundling are
taken into account when analyzing conglomerate mergers.121
Unfortunately, the Guidelines' approach ends with mergers. In
principle, nothing prevents applying the Commission's economically
rigorous approach to the question of likely foreclosure from vertical or
conglomerate integration. The problem remains, however, when the court
is forced to apply the very different analytical criteria under either Article
119. Id.136.
120. Id. 9 69-70.
121, Id T 93 ("Tying and bundling as such are common practices that often have no
anticompetitive consequences. Companies engage in tying and bundling in order to provide their
customers with better products or offerings in cost-effective ways.").
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101 or 102 to the question of whether the recently merged firm is engaging
in exclusionary vertical restraints depending on whether the restraints are
(sometimes arbitrarily) classified as mergers, anticompetitive agreements,
or an abuse of dominance.
Like its U.S. analog, E.U. competition law already contains most of
the analytical resources necessary for a coherent exclusionary vertical
restraints policy. Also, as in the United States, E.U. law applies these
analytical resources sporadically and inconsistently. Both systems stand in
dire need of economic systematization.
IV. A NORMATIVE FRAMEWORK FOR EVALUATING
EXCLUSIONARY VERTICAL RESTRAINTS
Properly understood, all instances of exclusionary vertical restraints-
whatever their form-are anticompetitive if they foreclose the opportunity
of some rival of one of the contracting parties-whether the party granting
or receiving the discount-to operate efficiently in the relevant market. At
their core, all exclusionary vertical restraints analyses should converge
upon a simple pairing of concepts: foreclosure and substantiality. The first
question is whether the contractual practice at issue forecloses any portion
of the relevant market. If it does not, the contractual practice is legal and
the analysis should come to an end. If the contractual practice does
foreclose some share of the relevant market, the next question is whether
that foreclosed share is substantial. Here, substantiality should be given an
economic, functional definition: foreclosure is "substantial," and hence
prima facie unlawful, if it denies rivals a reasonable opportunity to compete
for resources (whether customers or inputs) that would be necessary for the
rivals' efficient operation in the market.
A. FORECLOSURE
We take as our point of departure an oft-cited observation from then-
Judge Stephen Breyer's opinion in Barry Wright Corp. v. ITT Grinnell
Corp. that "virtually every contract to buy 'forecloses' or 'excludes'
alternative sellers from some portion of the market, namely the portion
consisting of what was bought."l 2 2 Since all contracts "foreclose," "we are
to take into account both the extent of the foreclosure and the buyer's and
122. Barry Wright Corp. v. ITT Grinnell Corp., 724 F.2d 227, 236 (1st Cir. 1983) (Breyer, J.).
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seller's business justifications for the arrangement." 23 The apparent import
of such an analytical approach would be to eliminate any independent
importance of the foreclosure element of exclusionary vertical restraints
cases and reduce the analysis to the substantiality prong.
Such was surely not Judge Breyer's intention. In an earlier part of the
opinion, Judge Breyer rejected the plaintiffs claim that Pacific Scientific's
discounts were below cost and therefore predatory.1 24 Once Judge Breyer
found the discounts to be above cost (both incremental and total), he
concluded that the price cut could "not be found anticompetitive or
exclusionary,"l 25 regardless of how much of the market was affected. In
other words, Judge Breyer refused to perform a substantiality function on
the price discounting claim unless it was first found to foreclose some share
of the market by making it impossible for competitors to match the
defendant's prices.
Properly understood, the foreclosure prong of the substantial
foreclosure analysis should serve an independent threshold function. It
should serve to make potentially unlawful only those vertical restraints that
prevent competitors from competing on the merits. To state it somewhat
more formally, a contract or contractual provision should be deemed to
foreclose some share of the market only when it prevents an equally
efficient competitor from profitably offering its own set of contractual
terms that the customer reasonably might chose in lieu of the defendant's
terms for some increment of the market's output. We shall refer to this
interpretation of foreclosure as the "reasonable sales opportunity" test.
Under our formulation of the test, unlike in the above-quoted language
from Barry Wright, most run-of-the-mill contracts would not foreclose at
all. Suppose a defendant offers to sell a customer one hundred tons of coal,
which constitutes the customer's coal requirements for the next year.
Following the Barry Wright formulation, one could say that the contract,
once accepted, forecloses rivals' ability to make sales to that customer for
the year, since the customer will not care to purchase any further coal once
it has satisfied its requirements. But if other sellers in the market had a
reasonable opportunity to bid for the same business and simply lost the bid
because their own bids were less attractive to the buyer, then it is not
sensible to speak of the contract as foreclosing any business at all. Under
123. Id at 236-37.
124. See id. at 231-36.
125. Id. at 236.
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our reasonable sales opportunity test, since every other seller in the market
was reasonably able to compete for the same business, there is no
foreclosure.
Under our interpretation of foreclosure, not even every exclusive
dealing contract forecloses a portion of the market. If an exclusive dealing
contract covers a sufficiently small, and hence contestable, share of the
market such that any rival in the market could reasonably offer its own
exclusive dealing contract, there is no foreclosure. Suppose, for example,
that a defendant offered an exclusive supply relationship for all of a buyer's
requirements for a two-year period. The buyer's share of the market is 2
percent. If even small rivals of the defendant are able to offer a competitive
exclusive deal for a two-year period that has a reasonable chance of being
accepted, then we would not deem the contract to foreclose any portion of
the market.
As discussed above, a vertical relationship such as a contract or sale
may not foreclose rivals if the rivals had a reasonable opportunity to
compete for the customer's business before the consummation of the
contract or sale. Judge Breyer's "every contract forecloses" maxim may
also confuse things in another sense-that is, with respect to the rival's
opportunities after its competitor has contracted with, or sold to, the
customer. The "every contract forecloses" maxim assumes a circumstance
in which the customer is willing to purchase only a fixed unit of the good
or service from a single seller, as might be the case of a commuter
shopping for an automobile or a retiree looking for a lawyer to prepare his
or her will. But, in many circumstances, the customer may be willing to
purchase generally substitutionary goods from multiple suppliers, assuming
that the goods are not perfect substitutes and the marginal utility provided
by each purchase exceeds the customer's reservation price. In such
circumstances, the first contract of sale may diminish the likelihood that the
customer will purchase the second good, but not foreclose it altogether
since the second seller may still have an opportunity to demonstrate that the
marginal utility of the second purchase makes it worth the customer's
while.
It is important to keep this latter qualification in mind, since
challenges to exclusionary vertical restraints often occur in markets in
which a dominant incumbent has longstanding relationships with most of
the major customers in the market and a new entrant is unlikely to persuade
customers quickly to abandon their dealing with the incumbent. If the new
entrant has a reasonable opportunity to make sales to customers that does
not replace the incumbent's sales-and, hence, to expand the market-the
6352011]
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incumbent's vertical relationships have no foreclosing effect. To give an
illustration, Nielsen Media Research is at present the sole supplier of
syndicated television audience ratings in most local television markets.
Until its exit from the business in 1993, however, Arbitron (which currently
supplies radio ratings) competed with Nielsen in local television ratings.126
During much of the time when the two companies competed in local
television ratings, substantially more than half of all local television
stations purchased ratings from both Arbitron and Nielsen.127 As to these
customers, at least, neither supplier's vertical relationship had even an ex
post foreclosing effect on the other supplier since the customers were
willing to purchase both companies' offerings.
Of course, exclusive contracts entered into by dominant firms often do
foreclose competitors. For example, suppose that customers view it as
indispensable that a retailer carry at least some of the dominant firm's
products on its shelves. In that context, small rivals may not have a
reasonable opportunity to match the dominant firm's exclusive offer, since
they cannot compete over the noncontestable portion of the dominant
firm's sales.' 28 The dominant firm's exclusive offer may be for such a large
piece of business that smaller rivals are unable to offer a comparable
supply commitment. The dominant firm may have locked up the market in
long-term exclusive contracts before the new rivals entered the market, in
which case they did not have a reasonable chance of entering into ex ante
competition for the contract. These are all examples of circumstances in
which a rival might be able to demonstrate the absence of a reasonable
sales opportunity for a particular portion of the market and, hence, some
degree of foreclosure.
Foreclosure can arise from a wide variety of vertical contractual
practices. In particular, both price and nonprice contractual terms can deny
rivals reasonable sales opportunities. We have already seen examples of
nonprice contractual terms-such as exclusivity commitments-that
foreclose. Similarly, some tying arrangements-in which the buyer must
purchase from the defendant a product that it otherwise might purchase
from another supplier if the customer wishes to purchase a monopoly
126. See Arbitron Discontinues Syndicated Television & Ratings Service, BUS. WIRE, Oct. 18,
1993, available in LEXIS.
127. Ailing Oligopoly: TV Station Rating Business, BROADCASTING, Apr. 23, 1990, at 63, 63
(reporting that in the top fifty markets, the percentage of stations subscribing to both Nielsen and
Arbitron had declined from 80 to 60 percent).
128. We return to the idea of "noncontestable" shares and "unavoidable trading partners" with our
discussion of the Intel case in Part V.A.
636 [Vol. 84:605
EXCLUSIONARY VERTICAL RESTRAINTS
product sold by the defendant-foreclose equally efficient rivals. But a
wide variety of predatory or discriminatory discounting and rebating
functions can have similar effects.
The most obvious example of a foreclosing pricing policy is a
predatory price. When a dominant firm offers buyers a below-cost price,
equally efficient rivals are unable to compete for sales to any customers
that are offered the predatory prices. The same is true of bundled discount
schemes that do not result in a predatory price on the package, but would
require a competitor that sold only one of the products covered by the
bundle to offer a below-cost price in order to make the customers willing to
accept the rival's offer and thereby forgo the package discounts. 129
Conversely, if the rival is able to match the bundled discounts by giving an
equivalent discount in the competitive market and doing so without having
to price below cost, then the rival is not foreclosed from making a sale.130
Thus, although single-product predatory pricing and bundled discounting
require somewhat different computations to determine whether the equally
efficient rival would be foreclosed from selling above cost in response to
the dominant firm's pricing offer,' 3 ' the foreclosure question to be asked in
both cases is analytically identical.
The same observation should also hold for secondary-line price
discrimination. If a manufacturer charges different wholesale prices to two
competing retailers, the discriminatory price could make it impossible for
the disadvantaged firm profitably to meet its competitor's price to
downstream customers. In such a circumstance, the reasonable sales
opportunity test would hold that the discriminatory price resulted in
foreclosure of a percentage of the market corresponding with the volume of
the goods sold to the advantaged retailer. Conversely, if the discriminatory
price merely made sales more profitable for one retailer than another, it
would not foreclose the retailer's sales opportunity in the downstream
market.
Tying arrangements can also create foreclosure, as the general test for
tying already recognizes.' 32 If the seller has market power in the tying
product and requires the buyer to purchase the tied product if it wants to
129. See, e.g., Cascade Health Solutions v. PeaceHealth, 515 F.3d 883, 894-97 (9th Cir. 2008).
130. Id.
131. See generally Daniel A. Crane, Mixed Bundling, Profit Sacrifice, and Consumer Welfare, 55
EMORY L.J. 423 (2006) (discussing mixed bundling).
132. See Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 16 (1984) (discussing the
foreclosure requirement).
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purchase the tying product, then rivals who make only the tying product
may be denied a reasonable opportunity to compete for some segment of
sales in the tied market. Conversely, when all firms selling in the tied
market also make sales in the tying market, the tying practice results in no
foreclosure since firms can respond to the tying firm's tied demand by
offering their own package sales of both products.
We have focused thus far on foreclosure of customers, but the same
test can be applied-with only a slight variation in language-to input
foreclosure.133 Instead of a reasonable sales opportunity test, we would ask
whether the practice-whether exclusive input acquisition, predatory
overbidding, or other input-oriented restraint-denied rivals a reasonable
purchase opportunity. For example, an output agreement that commits a
supplier to sell all of its output to a particular buyer should not be deemed
to foreclose if rivals had a reasonable opportunity to compete for the output
contract. Conversely, if rivals could not reasonably compete for the output
contract, for example because their own requirements were likely to be
smaller than the seller's output, then we would find the presence of
foreclosure and move to the substantiality prong.
B. SUBSTANTIALITY
Foreclosure is not, by itself, a cause for concern. Although we
disagree with Judge Breyer's broad dictum that every contract forecloses,
many forms of ordinary commercial contracts meet our reasonable sales
opportunity test and hence foreclose. Nonetheless, foreclosure should not
be considered problematic unless it is "substantial," or "anticompetitive" in
E.U. terms. Substantiality in this context should be given a functional,
economic definition.
Once a plaintiff has identified practices that foreclose competitors, it is
necessary to ascertain whether the foreclosure accounts for such a large
percentage of the market that it threatens the survival of rivals. The
foreclosure percentage may arise from a single practice or from the
cumulative effect of several foreclosing practices. For example, a dominant
firm might use a combination of tying contracts covering 20 percent of the
market, predatory prices covering another 30 percent of the market, and
exclusive dealing contracts covering yet another 10 percent of the market to
133. See Michael A. Salinger, Vertical Mergers and Market Foreclosure, 103 Q.J. ECON. 345, 346
(1988) (showing that vertical integration can lead to input foreclosure for unintegrated rivals).
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foreclose 60 percent of the market. 3 4 In such a case, the same
substantiality question should be asked as in a case in which a single
practice foreclosed 60 percent of the market. The form of foreclosure
should not affect the determination of substantiality.
Extant case law provides few economically useful analytical tools on
the meaning of substantiality. Take, for example, the leading articulation of
substantiality in the seminal Tampa Electric Co. v. Nashville Coal Co.
case:
To determine substantiality in a given case, it is necessary to weigh
the probable effect of the contract on the relevant area of effective
competition, taking into account the relative strength of the parties, the
proportionate volume of commerce involved in relation to the total
volume of commerce in the relevant market area, and the probable
immediate and future effects which pre-emption of that share of the
market might have on effective competition therein.135
U.S. and E.U. courts and competition authorities typically fall back on
percentages, holding for example that "foreclosure levels of less than 30 or
40 percent are not a substantial share."' 36 But such market share numbers,
picked from the air, are utterly arbitrary from an economic perspective.
Whether foreclosure is substantial in an economic sense depends on
whether the quantity of the foreclosure prevents rivals from functioning
efficiently in the market. Ten percent foreclosure might be enough to drive
competitors out of one market whereas foreclosure of 70 percent might be
perfectly consistent with vibrant competition in another.
In keeping with our reasonable sales opportunity definition of
foreclosure, we propose a "reasonable survival opportunity" test for
substantiality. Under this test, market foreclosure is not problematic unless
an equally efficient rival would lack a reasonable opportunity to obtain a
sufficient share of the nonforeclosed portion of the market to reach
minimum viable scale.
The first step in the substantiality analysis is to identify the minimum
134. See Daniel A. Crane, Does Monopoly Broth Make Bad Soup?, 76 ANTITRUST L.J. 663, 670-
72 (2010) (discussing the appropriate uses of the aggregation approach).
135. Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320, 329 (1961). Under E.U. law, very
similar elements are suggested to evaluate anticompetitive foreclosure. See supra notes 101-03.
136. Midwest Agency Servs., Inc. v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, No. 09-165-DCR, 2010 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 22457, at *18 (E.D. Ky. Mar. 11, 2010). On the European side, see Summary of Commission
Decision of 17 March 2010 Relating to a Proceeding Under Article 102 of the Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union and Article 54 of the EEA Agreement (Case COMP/39.386-Long
Term Electricity Contracts France), 2010 O.J. (C 133) 5, 5.
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viable scale necessary to compete in the market. Minimum viable scale, a
familiar concept from horizontal merger analysis,13 7 equals the total sales a
new entrant would need to reach its hurdle rate (a sufficient rate of return to
justify the investment) on its invested capital."' So long as a firm is
operating at or above minimum viable scale, foreclosure of some
percentage of the market does not threaten its market participation, even if
it frustrates its ability to expand. Partial market foreclosure strategies,
however, can eliminate a competitor's presence from the market altogether,
particularly when fixed costs account for a very large percentage of total
costs and firms therefore need a significant share of the market in order to
cover their fixed costs. 139 For example, the computer operating systems
market is characterized by increasing returns to scale and high fixed costs;
hence, by foreclosing even just a portion of the market, Microsoft may
have been able to prevent new entry by equally (or more) efficient rivals. 140
It should be noted that the relationship between minimum viable scale
and the nonforeclosed share of the market depends on whether sales in the
market are static, expanding, or shrinking. In an expanding market,
minimum viable scale expressed as a percentage of the market will shrink
over time whereas in a contracting market, it will expand. Further, the
entrance of a new firm into the market may have effects on the size of the
market to the extent that it is measured by revenues rather than units.1 41
The entry of a new brand often evokes a drop in the equilibrium prices of
137. In the United States, minimum viable scale has also been used in telecommunications
regulation. See Comcast Corp. v. FCC, 579 F.3d 1, 4 (D.C. Cir. 2009). In Europe, several instruments
use the concept of "minimum efficient scale" in order to perform a foreclosure assessment. Commission
Guidelines on the Assessment of Non-Horizontal Mergers Under the Council Regulation on the Control
of Concentrations Between Undertakings, 2008 O.J. (C 265) 6, 17; Commission Notice, Guidelines on
the Application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty, 2004 O.J. (C 101) 97, 108. See also Commission
Guidance on the Commission's Enforcement Priorities in Applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to
Abusive Exclusionary Conduct by Dominant Undertakings, 2009 O.J. (C 45) 7, 9; Case C-209/07,
Competition Auth. v. Beef Indus. Dev. Soc'y Ltd., 2008 E.C.R. 1-8637, 8652.
138. Steven C. Salop, Measuring Ease ofEntry, 31 ANTITRUST BULL. 551, 563 (1986).
139. See, e.g., Christodoulos Stefanadis, Selective Contracts, Foreclosure, and the Chicago
School View, 41 J.L. & ECON. 429, 444-45 (1998); Willard K. Tom, David A. Balto & Neil Averitt,
Anticompetitive Aspects of Market-Share Discounts and Other Incentives to Exclusive Dealing, 67
ANTITRUST L.J. 615, 625-26 (2000) (offering examples of foreclosure strategies that deny rivals'
ability to reach minimum viable scale).
140. Stefanadis, supra note 139, at 444-45.
141. U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM'N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES § 1.41
(1992) (explaining that market share is to be measured by "[d]ollar sales or shipments . .. if firms are
distinguished primarily by differentiation of their products," and by "[u]nit sales . . . if firms are




existing brands in the market,142 which means that the new entrant may
have to fight for a piece of a shrinking pie.
Once a plaintiff identifies the relevant minimum viable scale and
translates the revenue required into a market share percentage, the next step
in the substantiality analysis is to identify the probability that an equally
efficient competitor in head-to-head competition with the defendant or
other rivals in the market would secure a sufficient amount of business in
the contestable (nonforeclosed) portion of the market to meet its minimum
viable scale. Sometimes, the rival or rivals are already operating at the
minimum viable scale despite the foreclosure, in which case the answer to
the substantiality question is easy. But many vertical restraints cases
concern markets with a longstanding dominant incumbent and a new
entrant that has not yet reached minimum viable scale. Such cases require
assessing an equally efficient competitor's likelihood of success in the
nonforeclosed segment of the market.
In most cases, that analysis requires assessing the probability that
customers will switch from the incumbent supplier to the new entrant. Even
in the nonforeclosed portion of the market, new entrants often face a
considerable disadvantage in competing for business given entrenched
brand preferences, loyalty to existing suppliers, and switching costs. 143
These incumbency advantages could potentially result in even small
amounts of foreclosure excluding new entrants since a new entrant's
chances of winning business in the nonforeclosed segment of the market
are low.
Suppose, for example, a market in which a defendant monopolist has
exclusive contracts foreclosing 60 percent of the market. If the minimum
viable scale is equal to a 10 percent market share, is the market
substantially foreclosed to an equally efficient new entrant? In order to
enter efficiently, a new firm must secure 10 percent of the market's
business out of an available 40 percent. Put that way, it seems that the
foreclosure is not substantial because, if we assign an equal probability to
bidding success by the incumbent and the equally efficient new entrant, the
new entrant should expect to obtain a 20 percent market share. But the new
entrant's prospects for winning business in head-to-head competition with
142. Suman Basroy & Dung Nguyen, Multinomial Logit Market Share Models: Equilibrium
Characteristics and Strategic Implications, 44 MGMT. SCI. 1396, 1401 (1998) ("[F]or any of the
existing brands in the market, the optimal ex-post defensive pricing strategy in the face of entry ... is to
reduce the price.").
143. See LEE G. COOPER & MASAO NAKANiSHI. MARKET-SHARE ANALYSIS 56-57 (1988).
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the incumbent may very well be less than 50 percent. Even in the
nonforeclosed segment of the market, buyers may have strong loyalties to
the incumbent firm or an aversion to experimenting with a new supplier. If,
for example, the new entrant's likelihood of winning new business in head-
to-head competitive bidding is only 20 percent, then the new entrant should
not expect that it will be able to reach minimum efficient scale upon entry.
In that case, the foreclosure might be said to be substantial.
Yet it would be a mistake to find the presence of substantial
foreclosure simply by focusing on the new entrant's probable market share
following the first round of competition in the nonforeclosed portion of the
market. Very few new entrants operate at the minimum viable scale
immediately upon entry.14 4 Incumbency advantages erode over time, and
often quite rapidly.
Assume, for example, a market for widgets with a single monopolist,
minimum viable scale equal to 20 percent of the market, a 90 percent
incumbency advantage, and monthly purchase decisions by customers.
Further assume that the market is stable, consists of 2000 units, and that 50
percent of the market is foreclosed. The chart below reflects the market
share change in the nonforeclosed portion of the market on a monthly basis.
Even with the strong incumbency advantage and foreclosure of half of the
market, the new entrant reaches minimum viable scale within eight months
and essential market share parity in the nonforeclosed segment by the end
of the first year.
144. For example, in developing vertical integration rules for the cable television industry, the
Federal Communications Commission defined the minimum viable scale of a television network as
based on the number of subscribers a network must have after five years in the market in order to have a
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As a general rule, we propose that foreclosure should not be deemed
substantial if the minimum viable scale, expressed in units or revenues, is
less than the units or revenues1 4 5 in the nonforeclosed segment of the
market divided by the number of competitors. Thus, in our example of a
market with 50 percent foreclosure, minimum viable scale equal to 20
percent, and an incumbent monopolist and one new entrant, there would be
no substantial foreclosure as a matter of law.14 6
Our proposed rule has the effect of disregarding incumbency
advantages and assuming that, over time, the new entrant has an equal
chance of winning business as every other competitor. Several important
qualifications are necessary.
First, a generic application of this rule might lead to a false positive-
an erroneous finding of substantial foreclosure-if the new entrant's actual
probability of winning exceeds its generic probability of winning. Indeed,
far from arguing that the incumbent has an incumbency advantage, new
entrants often argue that, but for the foreclosure, they would quickly gain
market share since they would enter the market with a superior product or
145. See supra note 137.
146. In our example, the total number of units in the nonforeclosed segment of the market (1000)
divided by the number of competitors (here, two) is equal to 500. With a minimum viable scale of 20
percent, the new entrant needs 400 units to reach minimum viable scale. Thus, because the minimum
viable scale is fewer than the units in the nonforeclosed segment of the market, there is no substantial
foreclosure.
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lower price than the incumbent. Likewise, in private damages cases, the
plaintiffs damages model often assumes that but for the foreclosure, the
plaintiff would have rapidly gained a large market share.147 Courts and
agencies should take into account-perhaps with a grain of salt-the rival's
often self-serving claims about its product's superiority when determining
the necessary space for competition.
Second, in markets with very long intervals between competitive
cycles-for example, because there are few customers or long-term
contracts-incumbency advantages may take a long time to wear off. In
such cases, it may be necessary to relax the assumption that the new entrant
has an equal probability of winning business in the unforeclosed segment
of the market. Nonetheless, the analysis should remain bounded by realistic
assumptions about the rival's probability of winning and the timeframe
necessary for a new entrant to reach its hurdle rate on capital.
Third, partially foreclosed markets with multiple competitive firms
raise a number of special issues. In the Standard Stations case, Standard
Oil's exclusive dealing contracts amounted to only 6.7 percent of retail
sales in the relevant gasoline distribution market,148 yet the aggregate effect
of all of the seven major oil companies' exclusive dealing contracts may
have been to foreclose 65 percent of the overall market.14 9 None of the
seven major oil companies were foreclosed from the market, but the
exclusives presented entry barriers to new entrants who could not
reasonably expect to achieve minimum viable scale given the opportunity
to compete for only 35 percent of the market's business.
Although we are skeptical that the exclusive contracts in Standard
Stations diminished the market's competitiveness, we would cautiously
recognize the possibility of cumulative foreclosure in other cases. In such
cases, the baseline principle of substantiality-that foreclosure should not
be deemed substantial if the minimum viable scale is less than the units or
revenues in the nonforeclosed segment of the market divided by the
number of competitive firms in the market-should continue to apply.
Although increasing the denominator could lead to excessively liberal
findings of substantiality, markets that already exhibit a number of
competitive firms should be characterized by low minimum viable scales,
147. See Richard C. Hoyt, Dale C. Dahl & Stuart D. Gibson, Comprehensive Models for Assessing
Lost Profits to Antitrust Plaintiffs, 60 MINN. L. REv. 1233, 1243 (1976).
148. Standard Oil Co. of Cal. v. United States (Standard Stations), 337 U.S. 293, 295 (1949).
149. See Friedrich Kessler & Richard H. Stem, Competition, Contract, and Vertical Integration,
69 YALE L.J. 1, 29-30 (1959).
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thus limiting the potential size of the numerator. In Standard Stations, for
example, the seven major oil companies amounted to about 65 percent of
all retail sales, but the remainder was fragmented among seventy small
companies. 50 The presence of a number of smaller firms in the market will
often provide market-tested data on minimum viable scale and discipline
plaintiffs' claims that a large scale is necessary to compete in the market.
Further, when multiple firms in the market employ similar vertical
restraints-such as exclusive dealing contracts or other types of loyalty-
inducing provisions-the vertical restraints are more likely to be
manifestations of competition than exclusion. While a pattern of vertical
restraints by separate firms may be anticompetitive, it is most likely to be
true when the vertical restraints are being used to cartelize an industry, in
which case a separate analytical framework should come into play.' 5 1 It
would be very unusual to observe firms in an oligopolistic market
employing vertical restraints to exclude new entrants without also colluding
with one another. Individually, the firms would lack market power and
therefore could not foist undesirable restrictions on customers. If the firms
individually sought to induce their customers to agree to terms that would
exclude new entrants, they would have to pay the customers to agree to
such terms-for example, by giving discounts or other inducements. The
firms would be spending money to exclude new entrants, and each dollar
they spent on the campaign would rebound to the benefit of their existing
competitors as well.152 A far more likely interpretation in such a situation is
that vertical restraints are part of the currency of competition.
As with the foreclosure element, the substantiality element applies
equally in customer foreclosure and input foreclosure cases. Input
foreclosure can raise a rival's costs, for example, by forcing the rival to
purchase inferior or more expensive resources. 153 Such effects threaten the
competitiveness of the market when they threaten to prevent the rival from
150. See Standard Stations, 337 U.S. at 295.
151. See supra Part II.A.
152. Even in a fairly concentrated oligopoly, it is relatively unlikely that an individual firm would
expend resources to exclude or marginalize a rival if any benefit would be widely shared with the other
oligopolists. In Brooke Group Ltd v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 228 (1993),
for example, the Supreme Court found it implausible that a firm with an 11-12 percent share would
engage in predatory pricing, since it would have to generate $9 of market-wide supracompetitive profits
during the recoupment stage for every dollar invested in the predation stage in order to recover its
predatory investment.
153. See Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Steven C. Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion: Raising Rivals'
Costs to Achieve Power over Price, 96 YALE L.J. 209, 234-38 (1986) (discussing how competitors may
raise rivals' costs by limiting supply).
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selling profitably at a scale necessary to remain a competitive force. Hence,
in input foreclosure cases, we would ask whether the foreclosure is so
severe that rivals lack a reasonable opportunity to survive in the market, as
determined by their ability to cover their hurdle rates on capital.
It bears repeating that we have articulated a two-part prima facie test
for exclusionary vertical restraints, and not a comprehensive framework for
assessing legality in every vertical restraints case. In particular, we have not
dealt with efficiencies defenses, which are generally considered
affirmative defenses by the defendant after the plaintiff has made an
affirmative case of foreclosure.154 The twin principles of foreclosure and
substantiality should serve as an overarching screen in the full variety of
exclusionary vertical restraints cases. In situations in which the plaintiff
fails to demonstrate substantial foreclosure-as will be true in many
vertical restraints challenges-there is no reason to analyze efficiencies.' 55
V. THREE ILLUSTRATIONS
In the previous section, we proposed a unified prima facie test for all
exclusionary vertical restraints that requires a showing that the restraint
forecloses a substantial share of the relevant market. In this section, we
illustrate our proposed test with three cases in which applying our
framework could have improved the agency's or court's analysis. The cases
illustrate three sorts of vertical restraint circumstances: (1) customer
foreclosure, (2) input foreclosure, and (3) multiproduct foreclosure.
A. CUSTOMER FORECLOSURE: INTEL/AM
On August 4, 2010, Intel and the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC")
announced a settlement of the FTC's antitrust enforcement action against
154. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 58-59 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (en banc) (per
curiam) (setting out a multipart test for monopolization offenses, in which a procompetitive justification
is an affirmative defense to be proven by the defendant).
155. There is substantial literature on the efficiencies justifications for various kinds of vertical
restraints. See, e.g., David S. Evans & Michael Salinger, Why Do Firms Bundle and Tie? Evidence from
Competitive Markets and Implications for Tying Law, 22 YALE J. ON REG. 37 (2005) (explaining
bundling and tying practices as manifestations of product-specific scale economies); Jan B. Heide,
Shantanu Dutta & Mark Bergen, Exclusive Dealing and Business Efficiency: Evidence from Industry
Practice, 41 J.L. & ECON. 387 (1998) (arguing that business efficiency factors play a significant role in
firms' decisions regarding exclusive dealing); Benjamin Klein & Kevin M. Murphy, Exclusive Dealing
Intensifies Competition for Distribution, 75 ANTITRUST L.J. 433, 437-65 (2008) (examining the role of




Intel.156 The FTC settlement was the final major chapter in Intel's decade-
long antitrust war with Advanced Micro Devices ("AMD"), its major rival
in the global microprocessor market. Prior episodes included a settlement
with the Japanese Fair Trade Commission,157 a fine by the Korean Fair
Trade Commission approximately equivalent to $25 million,' 58 a $1.25
billion dollar payment by Intel to settle AMD's private antitrust lawsuit, 5 1
and a C1.06 billion (almost $1.5 billion) fine by the European
Commission,16 o the highest it had ever imposed.' 6' Intel challenged the
Commission decision in the GC. 162 The Commission's decision is notable
for its length-518 pages-although the publicly available version has
redacted confidential facts.' 63 For all its detail, however, the Commission
analysis omits an essential ingredient of an exclusionary vertical restraints
case-evidence that the relevant restraints substantially foreclosed the
relevant market by denying AMD the opportunity to reach minimum viable
scale.
Intel and AMD produce microprocessors and compete to supply
Original Equipment Manufacturers ("OEMs"), companies that produce
personal and business computers such as Dell, Hewlett Packard, NEC,
Acer, and Lenovo. Intel and AMD's corporate history is at the origin of
multiple disputes concerning intellectual property rights.16' In the early
156. Complaint, In re Intel Corp., No. 9341 (FTC Dec. 16, 2009), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9341/091216intelcmpt.pdf; Agreement Containing Consent Order, Intel,
No. 9341 (FTC July 28, 2010), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9341/100804intelagree.pdf
(settlement agreement).
157. Mark LaPedus, Intel Accepts Order to Stop Unfair Trade Practices in Japan,
INFORMATIONWEEK (Mar. 31, 2005, 9:12 PM), http://www.informationweek.com/story/showArticle.
jhtim?articlelD= 160401642.
158. S. KOR. FAIR TRADE COMM'N, CORRECTIVE MEASURES AGAINST INTEL'S ABUSE OF
MARKET DOMINANCE (2008), http://eng.ftc.go.kr/files/bbs/2008/Intel%2OCase(08.6.) 1.pdf.
159. Steve Lohr & James Kanter, A.MD.-Intel Settlement Won't End Their Woes, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 13, 2009, at BI.
160. Summary of Commission Decision of 13 May 2009 Relating to a Proceeding Under Article
82 of the EC Treaty and Article 54 of the EEA Agreement (COMP/C-3/37.990-Intel), 2009 O.J. (C
227) 13, 17.
161. James Kanter, Europe Fines Intel $1.45 Billion in Antitrust Case, N.Y. TIMES, May 14, 2009,
at B8.
162. See, e.g., Kevin J. O'Brien, Intel Appeals Antitrust Ruling, N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 2009,
www.nytimes.com/2009/07/23/technology/business-computing/23chip.html.
163. See Commission Decision of 13 May 2009 Relating to a Proceeding Under Article 82 of the
EC Treaty and Article 54 of the EEA Agreement (COMP/C-3/37.990-Intel) [hereinafter Intel
Provisional Commission Decision], available at http://ec.europa.eulcompetition/sectors/ICT/intel
provisionaldecision.pdf.
164. See Complaint at 5, Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. v. Intel Corp. (In re Intel), 452 F. Supp.
2d 555 (D. Del. 2006) (No. 05-441).
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1980s, IBM chose Intel to manufacture the Central Processing Units
("CPUs") for IBM's PCs. It only did so, however, on the condition that
Intel would license its technology to a second source provider-AMD.165
The IBM agreement resulted in Intel's CPU ("x86") becoming the de facto
industry standard. Shortly after the IBM agreement, AMD began to
complain that Intel was not providing the information necessary for AMD
to manufacture its new generation of microprocessors, which allegedly
allowed Intel to consolidate its power in the market.166 After years of
litigation, Intel was obliged to provide AMD with its x86 technology.16 7
In 1995, AMD started to move beyond merely copying Intel's
microprocessors and attempted to compete on both technology and price.
On the innovation front, AMD designed the first 64-bit microprocessor.168
On the price front, Intel justified its historically higher Average Selling
Price ("ASP") per unit as the result of better quality and performance.169
The companies have followed significantly different investment strategies.
Intel invested heavily in new billion-dollar manufacturing facilities (called
"fabs") with a view to expanding output in order to meet its market share
objectives. AMD opted to concentrate its capital investments in research
and development and outsourced the manufacture of its microprocessors.170
In the market for x86 microprocessors, Intel had a market share around 80
percent between 1998 and 2009 whereas AMD's usually hovered between
15 and 20 percent.' 7 1
AMD alleged that, beginning in the late 1990s, Intel employed a
variety of exclusionary contractual practices when dealing with OEMs and
retailers to slow AMD's market share growth. Intel granted the major
OEMs all-unit rebates and marketing payments in order to promote Intel-
based computers. It also directly or indirectly granted important retailers
(such as Media Markt in Europe) payments for the promotion of its
products.1 72 These rebates were allegedly associated with different degrees
of exclusivity commitments. AMD also accused Intel of imposing "naked
165. Id.
166. See id. at 6.
167. Id. at 7.
168. Intel Provisional Commission Decision, supra note 163, 146 (reporting that Intel launched
its own 64-bit CPU seventeen months later).
169. Id. J 136, 138.
170. Answer at 2-3, In re Intel, 452 F. Supp. 2d 555 (No. 05-441).
171. JOSHUA D. WRIGHT, INT'L CTR. FOR LAW & ECON., AN ANTITRUST ANALYSIS OF THE
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION'S CASE AGAINST INTEL 7 fig.1 (2010).
172. Intel Provisional Commission Decision, supra note 163, tj 177-81.
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restrictions" consisting of payments to major OEMs for delaying or
canceling the launching of AMD-based computers or for establishing
certain restrictions on their distribution.'7 3
Building on these facts, the Commission's decision to fine Intel
provided an unofficial application of its new economic approach to
dominance"' that unfortunately failed to solve the ambiguities and
inconsistencies identified in the previous section.175 The Commission's
decision showed problems from the beginning. As in the only previous
decision dealing with similar practices in the framework of the new
economic approach to Article 102, Tomra,'76 the Commission started by
denying any need to show market foreclosure in Article 102 cases generally
and in loyalty rebate cases particularly on the authority of prior case law
including Hoffmann-La Roche.177 Despite tipping its hat to the old form-
based approach, the Commission declared that it would perform an
economically oriented anticompetitive foreclosure analysis after all.
For simplicity, we focus here on the Commission's treatment of Intel's
de facto exclusivity rebates. Early in the decision, the Commission seemed
to express categorical hostility to exclusivity rebates, noting that
"customers which, on the basis only of competition on the merits, may
have awarded a part of their purchases to a competing supplier, may prefer
173. Summary of Commission Decision of 13 May 2009 Relating to a Proceeding Under Article
82 of the EC Treaty and Article 54 of the EEA Agreement (COMP/C-3/37.990---Intel), 2009 O.J. (C
227) 13, 16.
174. See Intel Provisional Commission Decision, supra note 163, 1916 ("The
Commission ... takes the view that this Decision is in line with the [economics-based] orientations set
out in the guidance paper.").
175. See Damien Geradin, The Decision of the Commission of 13 May 2009 in the Intel Case:
Wherels the Foreclosure and Consumer Harm?, I J. EUR. COMPETITION L. & PRAC. 112, 112 (2010).
176. Summary of Commission Decision of 29 March 2006 Relating to a Proceeding Under Article
82 of the Treaty Establishing the European Community and Article 54 of the EEA Agreement Against
Tomra Systems ASA, Tomra Europe AS, Tomra Systems BV, Tomra Systems GmbH, Tomra
Butikksystemer AS, Tomra Systems AB and Tomra Leergutsysteme GmbH (COMP/E-1/38.113-
Prokent-Tomra), 2008 O.J. (C 219) 11, 13-14.
177. Intel, 2009 O.J. (C 227) at 15 & n.1 (citing Case 85/76, Hoffmann-La Roche & Co. AG v.
Comm'n, 1979 E.C.R. 461, 89). See also Intel Provisional Commission Decision, supra note 163,
f919-920, 920 & n. 1225 (citing several relevant cases including Hoffnann-La Roche, 1979 E.C.R.
89; Case T-219/99, British Airways PLC v. Comm'n, 2003 E.C.R. 11-5917, 244, af'd, Case C-
95/04, 2007 E.C.R. 1-2331, 162, 65; Case T-203/01, Manufacture Franqaise des Pneumatiques
Michelin v. Comm'n (Michelin II), 2003 E.C.R. 11-4071, 156; Joined Cases T-24/93, T- 25/93, T-26/93
& T-28/93, Compagnie Maritime Belge Transps. SA v. Comm'n, 1996 E.C.R. 11-1201,11182-86; Case
C-393/92, Gemeente Almelo v. Energiebedrijf ljsselmij NV, 1994 E.C.R. 1-1477, 144; Case T-65/89,
BPB Indus. & British Gypsum Ltd. v. Comm'n, 1993 E.C.R. 11-389, 171, 120; and Case C-62/86,
AKZO Chemie BV v. Comm'n, 1991 E.C.R. 1-3359,1 149).
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to source all or nearly all of their inputs from the dominant company in
order to obtain the benefit of the discount.""' Later, however, the
Commission discussed the possibility of using a test proposed by the
Guidance Paper and popular in the United States: "[O]ne possible way of
examining whether exclusivity rebates are capable or likely to cause
anticompetitive foreclosure is to conduct an as efficient competitor
analysis."' 79 The "equally efficient competitor" test is intended to assess
whether the dominant firm itself would survive, given its cost structure, if it
had to respond to the challenged pricing structures. 80
Since most of the challenged rebating practices were single-product
practices (in other words, bundling claims were not an issue), the
Commission could not take the position that AMD was unable to compete
with Intel over the full range of CPU sales. Thus, in order to find that
Intel's rebate foreclosed AMD, the Commission made a finding that Intel
was an "unavoidable trading partner" for most of the major OEMs.' 8 1 In
other words, since some core group of the OEM's customers demanded
Intel microprocessors in their computers, the OEM had to do at least some
of its business with Intel. This meant that less than 100 percent of this
OEM's purchases were "contestable" in a competition between Intel and
AMD. Hence, the Commission found that when Intel offered a loyalty
rebate spread over all of the OEMs' CPU requirements, AMD could
attempt only to match that rebate over some fraction of the OEM's
requirements.182 If, in order to match Intel's loyalty rebate, AMD would be
forced to price below cost in the contestable segment, then an equally
efficient competitor to Intel would be foreclosed from selling to that
customer.
Much of the disagreement between Intel and the Commission on the
application of the equally efficient competitor test concerned what
constitutes an avoidable cost within the measurement of average avoidable
costs-in other words, the measure of cost used to assess whether AMD
would have to price below cost in order to match Intel's rebates.183 That
controversy is beyond the scope of this paper. The Commission found that,
178. Intel Provisional Commission Decision, supra note 163,1938.
179. Id. 11002.
180. Communication from the Commission, Guidance on the Commission's Enforcement
Priorities in Applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to Abusive Exclusionary Conduct by Dominant
Undertakings, 2009 OJ. (C 45) 7, I1. See also POSNER, supra note 6, at 215.
181. Intel Provisional Commission Decision, supra note 163,%1 870, 886, 892, 894.
182. Id. % 1002-12. See also Intel, 2009 OJ. (C 227) at 15.
183. Intel Provisional Commission Decision, supra note 163, 11036-54.
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as to a number of OEMs, at least some portion of the OEMs' business was
foreclosed to AMD by Intel's rebates,' 84 and we accept that finding as
legitimate for the sake of argument.
The problem with the Commission's analysis is that it essentially
stopped at foreclosure and failed to consider whether the foreclosure was
substantial in an economically meaningful sense. Significantly, there was
no finding that AMD was shut out of the market-indeed, from the late
1990s to 2009, AMD's market share grew from approximately 10 percent
to approximately 20 percent.' 8 5 Further, the Commission could not have
found that Intel's rebates foreclosed AMD's access to even the major
OEMs since AMD made significant sales to most of the major OEMs.1 86
What sort of evidence, then, should have sufficed to show that
whatever sales were foreclosed to AMD were sufficiently important that
they affected AMD's viability in the market? The Commission stressed that
the microprocessor industry is characterized by output expansion, rapid
innovation, falling prices,'87 and high barriers for entry and expansion'8 8 as
a result of the necessary research and development investments, brand
image, and fabs.189 From this, the Commission believed that high net
margins and economies of scale were crucial for survival.190 Since 2000,
several smaller competitors exited the market.191 In combination, these
factors provided evidence that the market was susceptible to
monopolization, but they did not show that foreclosure of AMD from a
particular segment of the market threatened AMD's viability. Indeed, for
much of the relevant period, AMD reported positive operating income.192
Although we are unable to reach a firm conclusion from the publicly
available data, it seems unlikely that a generally profitable and innovative
company with a growing market share could claim that it was substantially
foreclosed from the market.
184. Id fJ 1281, 1406, 1456, 1507, 1573-75.
185. WRIGHT, supra note 171, at 7 fig.1.
186. In 2006, Dell added AMD's Opteron microprocessor for use in its servers. Ashlee Vance,
Dell Hooks Up with AMD, REGISTER (May 18, 2006, 8:14 PM), http://www.theregister.co.uk/
2006/05/18/dell_picks amd. Hewlett Packard offered a business desktop with an AMD microprocessor
in 2002. Intel Provisional Commission Decision, supra note 163, 1952.
187. See Answer at 2, Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. v. Intel Corp. (In re Intel), 452 F. Supp. 2d
555 (D. Del. 2006) (No. 05-441).
188. Intel Provisional Commission Decision, supra note 163, 1881.
189. Seeid. 866.
190. See id. 9875.
191. Id. 1882.
192. WRIGHT, supra note 171, at 10.
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Rather than attempting to prove that the foreclosure was substantial
insofar as it threatened AMD's ability to remain a viable and innovative
presence in the market, the Commission focused on the impact of Intel's
loyalty rebates on customer choice.19 3 The Commission believed the
foreclosure of AMD from a segment of an OEM's business harmed
consumers because it diminished the variety of purchasing options they
faced, even if it did not increase their prices.194 Thus, some computer users
who would have preferred an AMD microprocessor to an Intel
microprocessor would find their preference thwarted because the retailer
they visited would offer only an Intel microprocessor.
This argument fails to give sufficient weight to consumers' interests in
lower prices and OEMs' incentives to promote the consumer interest. As
long as AMD remains a viable presence in the market, the OEMs must
weigh Intel's discount and rebate offers as a tradeoff between a real price
reduction (as opposed to a temporary predatory price cut to be followed by
supracompetitive monopoly prices following AMD's ouster from the
market) and diminution in the variety they can offer their customers.
Assuming a competitive computer market, an OEM's profit-maximizing
strategy will be either lower price or greater variety, whichever increases
its market share by satisfying customer demand. If the OEM decides to
forgo variety for price, this will usually be because customers, in the
aggregate, would prefer lower prices to greater variety. Examples of similar
tradeoffs abound in the economic literature. For instance, Benjamin Klein
and Kevin Murphy have shown that retailers, by giving manufacturers
exclusive shelf-space deals, are able to elasticize the demand facing the
manufacturer by eliminating idiosyncratic variety preferences and hence
exact lower wholesale prices from the manufacturers.' 95 While some
customers with strong variety preferences may face net welfare losses,
consumers as a class generally gain from the lower prices.' 96
Throughout the period relevant to the Intel/AMD saga, microprocessor
prices to final consumers plummeted. According to the Bureau of Labor
Statistics, in recent years prices relative to performance have dropped more
precipitously for microprocessors than for any other of the 1200 product
193. Intel Provisional Commission Decision, supra note 163, if 1598-1616 (discussing how
Intel's exclusionary practices had a negative impact on customers who otherwise would have had a
wider price and quality choice).
194. Id.
195. Klein & Murphy, supra note 155, at 437-65.
196. Id. at 451-54.
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categories that the Bureau tracks.197 This evidence is at odds with a finding
that Intel impaired AMD's ability to function in the market.
The Commission's Intel decision shows significant progress by
engaging in a rigorous foreclosure analysis. Alas, it stops with the first half
of the story. Foreclosure in this sense-the denial of a reasonable sales
opportunity-is endemic in many highly competitive markets. Without an
analysis of substantiality, however, it fails to provide a satisfactory answer
to the questions competition policy is meant to address.
B. INPUT FORECLOSURE: APPLE / ORANGE FRANCE
A good example of the need to systematize the European approach to
exclusionary vertical restraints and anticompetitive input foreclosure
appears in the French Competition Authority's enforcement action against
Apple and Orange France.' 8 Apple-the manufacturer of the iPhone-and
Orange France-a provider of phone services in France and several other
European countries-agreed that Orange France would be the exclusive
distributor of the iPhone to the French market for a five-year period.199 On
the surface, the relevant market shares seemed to make the deal
unproblematic. In 2008, iPhones enjoyed a share of 5.3 percent of all
smartphones, and smartphones amounted to only 10-13 percent of the
197. See Robert E. Cooper, AMD v. Intel: An Assault on Price Competition, GLOBAL
COMPETITION POL'Y 8 (Mar. 17, 2008), http://www.intel.com/pressroom/legal/docs/Cooper GCP
Mar08.pdf. The relevant data charts appear in Motion of Intel Corp. Under Rule 3.36 for Leave to Take
a Deposition of the Bureau of Labor Statistics Under Rule 3.33(c)(1) at Ex. 2, In re Intel Corp., No.
9341 (FTC May 27, 2010), available at http://www.fic.gov/os/adjpro/d9341/100527
intelmoleavedeposebls.pdf.
198. Council Regulation 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the Implementation of the Rules on
Competition Laid Down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, art. 3, 2003 O.J. (L 1) 1, 8 (EC) ("Where
the competition authorities of the Member States or national courts apply national competition law to
agreements, decisions by associations of undertakings or concerted practices within the meaning of
Article 81(1) of the Treaty which may affect trade between Member States within the meaning of that
provision, they shall also apply Article 81 of the Treaty to such agreements, decisions or concerted
practices.").
199. Autorit6 de la concurrence [Competition Authority] decision No. 10-D-01, Jan. 11, 2010
(Fr.), available at http://www.autoritedelaconcurrence.fr/pdflavis/lOdOl.pdf. For English explanations
of the case see Press Release, Autorit6 de la Concurrence, End of the iPhone Marketing Exclusivity in
France (Jan. 12, 2010) [hereinafter Postdecision Press Release], available at
http://www.autoritedelaconcurrence.fr/user/standard.php?id-rub=368&id-article=1335, and Press
Release, Autorit6 de la Concurrence, Marketing of the iPhone in France (Nov. 3, 2009) [hereinafter
Predecision Press Release], available at http://www.autoritedelaconcurrence.fr/user/standard.phpid
rub-316&id article=1297.
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mobile phones sold worldwide.200 Further, it is hard to see how exclusive
channeling of a relatively small market share item would foreclose rivals
from the market.
The French Competition Authority, however, believed that the
iPhone's unique attractiveness made it a larger competitive presence than
its small market share. Rivals of Orange such as SFR were signing their
own exclusive distribution deals for other attractive smartphones such as
the Blackberry and HTC, but rather than considering the rivals' exclusive
deals as likely to mitigate any foreclosing effects of the Apple/Orange deal,
the French Competition Authority worried about cumulative foreclosure by
a series of manufacturer-distributor deals. 201 Faced with the French
Competition Authority's enforcement action, Apple and Orange agreed to
suspend any pact of exclusivity for the iPhones already in the market and to
limit any exclusive agreement concerning the distribution of future versions
of this product to a maximum of three months.202
Under our substantial foreclosure test, the Apple/Orange exclusive
deal might not present foreclosure, much less substantial foreclosure. The
fact that rival distributors were negotiating their own exclusive deals for
marquee brands suggests the existence of an active auction process for
exclusive distribution rights. If Orange foreclosed SFR by signing up
Apple, then SFR foreclosed Orange by signing up Blackberry and HTC.
More likely, the cellular phone distribution market is characterized by
"[c]ompetition-for-the-contract" rather than competition within the
brand.203 To be sure, winner-takes-all auctions for exclusive distribution
rights might reduce the number of distributor firms or marginalize the
fringe firms, but a mere reduction in the number of distributors does not
200. ROBERT HAHN & HAL J. SINGER, MOBILEFUTURE, WHY THE IPHONE WON'T LAST FOREVER
AND WHAT THE GOVERNMENT SHOULD DO TO PROMOTE ITS SUCCESSOR 11 tbl.2 (2009) (showing that
in the first quarter of 2008 Apple held a 5.3 percent worldwide market smartphone share); Press
Release, Gartner, Gartner Says Worldwide Mobile Phone Sales Declined 8.6 Per Cent and Smartphones
Grew 12.7 Per Cent in First Quarter of 2009, available at http://gartner.com/it/page.jsp?id=985912
(indicating in table 2 that in the first quarter of 2008 Apple held a 5.3 percent market share and stating
that "Smartphone sales represented 13.5 per cent of all mobile device sales in the first quarter of 2009,
compared with II per cent in the first quarter of 2008"); Jim Dalrymple, Apple Doubles Its iPhone
Market Share, CNET (May 20, 2009, 6:13 AM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-13579_3-10245339-
37.htmi ("Apple's share of worldwide smartphone sales grew from 5.3 percent in the first quarter of
2008 to 10.8 percent in the first quarter of 2009.").
201. See Predecision Press Release, supra note 199.
202. Id.; Postdecision Press Release, supra note 199.
203. Paddock Publ'ns, Inc. v. Chi. Tribune Co., 103 F.3d 42, 45 (7th Cir. 1996) (Easterbrook, J.)
("Competition-for-the-contract is a form of competition that antitrust laws protect rather than proscribe,
and it is common.").
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necessarily signal a general diminution in the competitiveness of the
distribution function.
Assuming that the exclusivity deal foreclosed some rival by denying it
a reasonable input-acquisition opportunity, there remains the substantiality
question-whether carrying the iPhone was so important to the foreclosed
distributors that its denial threatened their existence in the cell phone
distribution market. We do not dispute that current market share numbers
may sometimes be a poor proxy for the competitive importance of an input,
but it is unlikely that access to the iPhone was indispensable for survival in
the market. Again, the example of the SFR / Blackberry and HTC deals
suggests the contrary.
Further, it would not be in Apple's interests to grant exclusive
distributorship rights that would weaken the competitiveness of the
distribution market.204 To Apple, distribution is merely a cost that it prefers
to cover as inexpensively as possible. A monopolist distributor would raise
prices and diminish sales, which would mean that Apple would sell fewer
iPhones without sharing in the distributor's higher prices. 205 We do not
mean to suggest that exclusive distributorship agreements can never be
anticompetitive since the manufacturer's interests on the question of
distributor power will be aligned with those of the consumer.206 In the case
of a strong and sophisticated manufacturer like Apple, however, the
prospect that the exclusive agreement would diminish the distribution
segment's long-run competitiveness seems remote.
The Apple / Orange France episode provides an opportunity to
reiterate a point made earlier-that secondary-line price discrimination is
just a species of input foreclosure. Suppose that instead of granting Orange
exclusivity, Apple had simply given it preferential pricing terms that had
made it difficult for rival distributors to carry the iPhone. In that case, the
same analytical questions-Did the discount structure deny rivals a
reasonable input purchase opportunity and was it so substantial that it
denied them a reasonable survival opportunity?-should be addressed.
204. See, e.g., Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 896 (2007)
("[T]he interests of manufacturers and consumers are aligned with respect to retailer profit margins.");
Francine Lafontaine & Margaret Slade, Exclusive Contracts and Vertical Restraints: Empirical
Evidence and Public Policy, in HANDBOOK OF ANTITRUST ECONOMics 391, 395-97 (Paolo Buccirossi
ed., 2008).
205. See Leegin, 551 U.S. at 896.
206. See Robert Pitofsky, In Defense of Discounters: The No-Frills Case for a Per Se Rule
Against Vertical Price Fixing, 71 GEO. L.J. 1487, 1491 (1983) (questioning the assumption that
manufacturer interests are aligned with those of retailers).
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C. MULTIPRODUCT FORECLOSURE: MASIMO/TYCO
As noted at the outset, one of the key sources of confusion in vertical
restraints cases has been the treatment of contractual terms that span
multiple product lines, particularly those that involve the grant of a price
concession in exchange for purchase commitments across multiple product
categories. Courts have struggled to categorize such terms analytically,
analogizing or disanalogizing them to tying, exclusive dealing, bundling,
and predatory pricing.2 07 This focus on legal categorization rather than
economic analysis has led to inconsistent and confused decisions.
A good example appears in the private litigation between Masimo and
Tyco, competitors in the production of pulse oximetry systems, which
measure a patient's lung function.2 08 Masimo claimed that Tyco attempted
to exclude it from the pulse oximetry market through a variety of vertical
contractual practices including "loyalty discounts," sole-source exclusive
dealing contracts, bundled rebates, and exclusionary financing terms.209 A
jury returned a verdict for Masimo on several of the challenged practices,
but the district judge set aside the verdict insofar as it predicated liability on
the bundled rebates. 210 Masimo challenged that holding on appeal to the
Ninth Circuit.21'
During the course of the appeal, the Ninth Circuit decided another
bundled discounting case-Cascade Health Solutions v. PeaceHealth.212 In
that case, the Ninth Circuit held that "a plaintiff who challenges a package
discount as anticompetitive must prove that, when the full amount of the
discounts given by the defendant is allocated to the competitive product or
products, the resulting price of the competitive product or products is
below the defendant's incremental cost to produce them." 213 On appeal,
Masimo resisted application of the PeaceHealth discount attribution
standard, arguing that "Tyco's bundling practices were actually illegal
market-share discounts, rather than general bundled discounts." 214 The
Ninth Circuit credited Masimo's argument:
207. See supra Part Ill.A.
208. Masimo Corp. v. Tyco Health Care Grp., L.P., No. CV 02-4770 MRP, 2006 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 29977, at *2-3 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 22, 2006), affd, 350 Fed. App'x 95 (9th Cir. 2009).
209. Id. at *3.
210. Id. at *15-18, *37, *4344.
211. Masimo, 350 F. App'x 95.
212. Cascade Health Solutions v. PeaceHealth, 515 F.3d 883 (9th Cir. 2008).
213. Id. at 909.
214. Masimo, 350 F. App'x at 97.
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There is truth to Masimo's argument. Tyco's bundling contracts gave
customers a price discount for purchasing a number of unrelated
products together, one being pulse oximetry. However, receipt of the
discount was conditioned upon customers purchasing 90-95% of their
requirements of those products from Tyco. If a customer bought less
than the required minimum, the discounts would be lost or decreased.
That is conditioning the discount on the requirement of near complete
exclusivity. This effectively prevents customers from dealing in the
goods of competitors, if the customers want to obtain Tyco's discount.
That is the hallmark of exclusive dealing.215
Despite agreeing in principle with Masimo's argument, the Ninth Circuit
affirmed the district court's vacatur of the jury verdict because there was
insufficient evidence that the foreclosure was substantial.216 Also, Masimo
had litigated the case under a bundled discount theory and should not have
been allowed to change its position on appeal.217
The Ninth Circuit's reasoning illustrates the continued confusion
caused by a form-based approach to vertical restraints. Under the court's
approach, the initial decision categorized the restraint as either bundled
discounting or tying / exclusive dealing. If the former, the practice would
be subject to a discount reallocation exercise for the purpose of establishing
whether an equally efficient rival that made only one of the products
covered by the bundled discount would be foreclosed from competing for
that product. If the practice were categorized as tying, foreclosure would be
assumed and the analysis would shift immediately to whether the
foreclosure was substantial.
Under our proposed framework, the foreclosure and substantiality
questions should be asked in succession regardless of any initial
categorization of the practice as bundled discounting, tying, exclusive
dealing, or something else. Failure to ask both questions could result in
false positives. Categorization of the practice as predatory pricing could
result in a finding of liability even though the number of effectively below-
cost contracts was insufficient to deprive Masimo of a reasonable
opportunity to reach minimum viable scale. Categorization of the practice
as tying could result in a finding of liability even if Masimo were
effectively able to dissuade customers from accepting Tyco's bundled offer
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The lynchpin of the court's categorization decision was its belief that
the conditioning of the discount on a market share commitment "effectively
prevents customers from dealing in the goods of competitors, if the
customers want to obtain Tyco's discount." 218 But suppose that the
discounts on noncompetitive products (in other words, products that
Masimo did not sell) were small enough to allow Masimo profitably to
offer its own discounts on pulse oximeters sufficient to neutralize the effect
of Tyco's bundled discount. In that case, the fact that the bundled offer
required a minimum market share commitment from the customer would
have no foreclosing effect. Masimo apparently recognized this since it
claimed that it would only have been able to match the discounts by pricing
substantially below cost.219 If the converse were true, there would be no
foreclosure.
VI. CONCLUSION
The law of exclusionary vertical restraints is in dire need of overall
systemization. Courts and agencies on both sides of the Atlantic frequently
stumble over apparent differences among commercial practices that are
similar in their exclusionary potential. Instead of seeking to understand
whether the practices in fact diminish the market's competitiveness, the
courts or agencies often fall back on categorical formalisms that lead to
dramatically different treatment of economically indistinguishable
practices.
Fortunately, both U.S. and E.U. legal and administrative structures
contain sufficient resources to emerge from the present muddle without
radical reimagination of either system's principles or precedents. The twin
principles of foreclosure and substantiality that we have outlined in this
Article have sufficient roots in both systems to justify their incremental
elevation to a generalized test for exclusionary vertical restraints.
Merely recognizing substantial foreclosure as a meta-analytical matrix
will not eliminate many difficulties in implementing vertical restraints
policy. Thorny issues-such as the appropriate measure of cost to use in
assessing foreclosure-will persist. Still, unifying the first principles would
establish a solid foundation for progressing toward a more coherent and
consistent vertical restraints policy.
218. Id.
219. Masimo Corp. v. Tyco Health Care Grp., L.P., No. CV 02-4770 MRP, 2006 U.S. Dist.




TABLE. Chronological Table of Market Shares in Cases of Rebates
Date Case Name Market Share (%)
1975 Coperatieve Vereniging 'Suiker Unie' UA v. 90-95
Commissiona
1979 Hoffmann-La Roche & Co. AG v. Commissionb 47-100
1983 NV Nederlandsche Banden-Industrie Michelin v. 57-65
Commission (Michelin I)'
1991 Hilti AG v. Commissiond 70-80
1993 BPB Industries and British Gypsum Ltd. v. 90-93
Commissione
1994 Tetra Pak International SA v. Commission' 90-95
1999 Irish Sugar Plc v. Commission' 90
2001 Portuguese Republic v. Commissionh Legal Monopoly
2003 Manufacture Frangaise des Pneumatiques Michelin >50
v. Comm'n (Michelin II)'
2003 British Airways Plc v. Commissiod +40
aJoined Cases 40-48, 50, 54-56, 111, 113 & 114/73, Co6peratieve Vereniging 'Suiker Unie' UA v.
Comm'n, 1975 E.C.R. 1663 (citing Commission Decision of 2 January 1973 Relating to Proceedings
Under Articles 85 and 86 of the EEC Treaty (IV/26.918-European Sugar Industry), 1973 O.J. (L 140)
17, 39).
bCase 85/76, Hoffmann-La Roche & Co. AG v. Comm'n, 1979 E.C.R. 461, 466-67 (citing
Commission Decision 76/642 of 9 June 1976 Relating to a Proceeding Under Article 86 of the Treaty
Establishing the European Economic Community (IV/29.020-Vitamins), 1976 O.J. (L 223) 27, 29-
30).
cCase 322/81, NV Nederlandsche Banden-Industrie Michelin (Michelin 1), 1983 E.C.R. 3461, 33
(citing Commission Decision 81/969 of 7 October 1981 Relating to a Proceeding Under Article 86 of
the EEC Treaty (IV/29.491-Bandengroothandel Frieshbrug BV/NV Nederlandsche Banden-Industrie
Michelin), 1991 O.J. (L 353) 33, 40).
dCase T-30/89, Hilti AG v. Comm'n, 1991 E.C.R. 11-1439, $ 85, 89, 92 (citing Commission Decision
88/138 of 22 December 1987 Relating to a Proceeding Under Article 86 of the EEC Treaty
(IV/30.787-Hilti), 1988 O.J. (L 65) 19, 22).
'Case T-65/89, BPB Indus. & British Gypsum Ltd. v. Comm'n, 1993 E.C.R. 11-389, 1100 (citing
Commission Decision 89/22 of 5 December 1988 Relating to a Proceeding Under Article 86 of the EEC
Treaty (IV/31.900-BPB Indus.), 1989 O.J. (L 10) 50, 61).
Case T-83/91, Tetra Pak Int'l SA v. Comm'n, 1994 E.C.R. 11-755, $ 13 (citing Commission Decision
92/163 of 24 July 1991 Relating to a Proceeding Pursuant to Article 86 of the EEC Treaty (IV/31043-
Tetra Pak II), 1991 O.J. (L 72) 1, 3).
g Case T-228/97, Irish Sugar Plc v. Comm'n, 1999 E.C.R. 11-2969, 70-71 (citing Commission
Decision 97/624 of 14 May 1997 Relating to a Proceeding Pursuant to Article 86 of the EC Treaty
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(IV/34.621, 35.059/F-3-Irish Sugar), 1997 O.J. (L 258) 1, 18).
h Case C-163/99, Portuguese Republic v. Comm'n, 2001 E.C.R. 1-2613, 56; Commission Decision
1999/199 of 10 February 1999 Relating to a Proceeding Pursuant to Article 90 of the Treaty
(IV/35.703-Portuguese Airports), 1999 O.J. (L 69) 31, 35.
SCase T-203/01, Manufacture Frangaise des Pneumatiques Michelin v. Comm'n (Michelin 11), 2003
E.C.R. 11-4071.
Case T-219/99, British Airways Plc v. Comm'n, 2003 E.C.R. 11-5917, 211 (citing Commission
Decision 2000/74 of 14 July 1999 Relating to a Proceeding Under Article 82 of the EC Treaty (IV/D-
2/34.780-Virgin/British Airways), 2000 O.J. (L 30) 1, 11) (listing market shares ranging from 39.7
percent to 46.3 percent), affd, Case C-95/04, 2007 E.C.R. 1-2331, % 62, 65.
